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The wars of Yugoslav dissolution have brought into the open the unresolved conflict
between self-determination and the sanctity of state borders.
It is not sufficient for the world community to say that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a
state .... [I]t is not clear how the world community can pretend to insist on Bosnia-
Herzegovina continuing as a single state against the wishes of many of its citizens, unless
the world community is willini to force them to live together, as did the previous rulers
of Yugoslavia and the Balkans.
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I. INSISTING ON SUCCESS: BRITTLE BOSNIA
I think it obvious that while we may owe Bosnians a great deal, we owe
Bosnia nothing. In the quotidian bustle of politics, we seldom pose ultimate
questions about the existing order-we tend to assume France or Japan as a
kind of given-but such heuristics hardly should, and barely can, apply to a
shadow like Bosnia. Almost everyone agrees that Bosnia today is
dysfunctional, its existence too contingent to take for granted, and so we
reasonably may and properly should ask fundamental constitutional questions
about its future, its people, and their state.
And yet: Bosnia. The name conjures a moral vision more than an actual
state. A moral vision and a political commitment: to "no peace without
justice," to "never again," to not rewarding aggression, to multiculturalism
and the political irrelevance of ethnicity, to cosmopolitanism over post-
modem neo-tribalism. We have come to believe in a commitment to preserve,
to restore, to redeem the state of Bosnia.
It is also, of course, the physical repository of some four million people
in a region of millions more-a "they" not always included in "our"
discussion. 3 There, in that place, people also have moral and political
commitments, and the pressing imperatives of life lived: economies,
infrastructures, rules, families, aspirations, fears-and borders. It has been
more than eight years since the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The 1995 Dayton Accords4 ended the military conflict, but their
political and civilian provisions have been only imperfectly implemented.
Bosnia is internationally recognized and at peace, but in important ways
remains effectively partitioned into ethnicized quasi-statelets, its weak
confederal structure propped up by direct, active international intervention
5
3. The "we" I refer to in this Article is, first, those who read it, but more broadly, the
interested policy community, including governments, international institutions, and the legal academy--
principally, though not exclusively, composed of non-Bosnian actors. I do not mean to suggest a unity of
views or interests among these outsiders-I, for instance, disagree almost completely with the main lines
of international policy-although I will be arguing that there has been a dominant political commitment
about which we may speak meaningfully. "They"-one of the logical corollaries of "us"--refers to the
peoples of Bosnia, some of whom, of course, agree with and participate in the mainstream of
international discourse about their country, and some of whom do not. But it is unquestionably their
country; "they" are the peoples who represent the "self' in self-determination--or would, if "we" were
not presently interposed into the debate.
4. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec.
14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Accords].
5. This is a view widely shared by international and local officials, NGOs, journalists,
supporters and opponents of further integration, and private citizens. See, e.g., General Affairs Council,
2002 Annual Council Review of the Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern Europe, 34
CEPS EUROPA SOuTH-EAST MONITOR (2002) (noting that Bosnia is still not a self-sustaining state, lacks
a single economic market, has weak state institutions, and suffers from insufficient refugee return);
Robert B. Hitchner, How To Leave a Democratic Bosnia, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 29, 2003, at A7
(describing continuing political instability, social fragility, and economic weakness in Bosnia, which
requires ongoing administration by the international community); William Pfaff, Time To Concede
Defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina, The Dayton Accords, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Oct. 10, 2002, at 9; Tihomir
Loza, Cheerleading Bosnia, TRANSITIONS ONLINE'S BALKANS RECONSTRUCTION REP., Mar. 14, 2003, at
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/o/a5b650a284d29053cl 256cf3004607ac?opendocument; Patrick
Moore, Bosnia To Be Ready for EU Membership by 2009?, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, May 2, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/05/4-SEE/see-020503.asp (quoting the President of the Council of
Ministers, Adnan Terzid, as saying that Bosnia still has much to do to become a "self-sustaining state"
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Although the international protectorate-managed through the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) 6-has made considerable progress in stabilizing and even integratin
the territory,7 much of the integrationist agenda has not been successful yet.
and that "[t]here needs to be a thread from the central government down to [each] municipality in order
for the country to function properly, [but] that thread is currently cut at several places") (alteration in
original); Patrick Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?, RFE/RL BALKAN REP., Sept. 8, 2003,
http://www.rferl.orgreports/balkan-report/2003/09/29-050903.asp; Wolfgang Petritsch, How To
Resuscitate a Failed State, INT'L HERALD TRIB. ONLINE, July 3, 2002, at
http://www.iht.com/search/ihtsearch.php?id = 63265&owner=&date=20020704160227 (listing goals of
former High Representative Petritsch as "acceleration of the return of refugees to establish the rule of
law; institution-building to turn the country into a functioning state; and economic reform to enable this
state to be self-sufficient, at least in the medium term").
6. In late 1997, the intergovernmental Peace Implementation Council overseeing the
international community's efforts in Bosnia accorded the expanded "Bonn Powers" to the Office of the
High Representative. See EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, RESHAPING INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, PART I1: INTERNATIONAL POWER IN BOSNIA, Mar. 20, 2003, at
http://www.esiweb.org/reports/bosnia/showdocument.php?document id=8; Gerald Knaus & Felix
Martin, Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj, J. DEMOCRACY, July
2003, at 60, 63-64. The High Representative has used these expanded powers to enact sweeping policy
reforms. See Petritsch, supra note 5; Dragan Stanimirovic, Ashdown Strikes Again, TRANSITIONS
ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2002, at http://www.tol.cz. The protectorate has been the subject of recent controversy
about whether or not Bosnians should determine their own future. See generally Hitchner, supra note 5;
Knaus & Martin, supra.
7. Progress towards integration has been considerable. Developments include: creation of a
state-level defense ministry; a unified license plate system; a common currency; a statewide phone
service; some educational reform; establishment of a state court and state-wide criminal code; some
cross-ethnic refugee returns; acknowledgement of state-wide citizenship for members of all ethnic
groups; development of considerable trade links and protection of the freedom of movement; and a
general relaxation of ethnic tensions. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF
REFUGEE RETURN IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA (2002), http://crisisweb.org//library/documents/
report archive/A400847_13122002.pdf; Anna Morawiec Mansfield, Note, Ethnic but Equal: The Quest
for a New Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 2052, 2066-73 (2003)
(discussing the "Constituent Peoples Decision" by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that makes the three nations constituent peoples of the whole of Bosnia, not merely of their respective
entities); Colin Woodard, In Rebuilt Bosnia, No Terror Toehold, CHRISTIAN Se. MONITOR, Mar. 24,
2004, at 1, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0324/pOlsOl-woeu.html (describing a reduction in the
physical reminders of the 1992-95 war and the success of the international reconstruction effort to
reestablish Bosnia's infrastructure, border patrol services, and national governing institutions); Loza,
supra note 5; Patrick Moore, High Representative Hails Progress in Bosnia..., RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Oct.
9, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/4-see/see-091003.asp (noting increased inter-ethnic
cooperation, steps towards a statewide tax administration, unified armed forces, and joint governance of
Mostar, and quoting High Representative Paddy Ashdown as saying that the Dayton Accords are "being
used not as in the past to block reform but to [promote] it" and that "[t]he constitution of the country has
now become the property of its people, not of the international community"). But see Moore, supra
(noting Ashdown's comment that Bosnia remains in a period of "lawless rule").
8. The project might yet succeed. However, continued failures of the integrative project
include: no unified tax structure; no common economic regulatory zone; the continued existence of
separate military establishments; large populations of refugees and internally displaced persons;
continued near total ethnic segregation; and continued dependence on foreign assistance for
macroeconomic, political, and military stability. See Stanimirovic, supra note 6. See also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002, at 297 (noting refugee returns occurring at "a rate which would
take two decades to clear the backlog," and that even those returns were not "self-sustaining ... as
returnees continued to face scant employment opportunities and great obstacles to education for
minority children"); Bogdan Ivanisevic, Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004, http://hrw.org/wr2k4/16.htm#_Toc58744965 (noting, inter alia,
that roughly one-half of returnees have gone back to areas in which they were not the ethnic majority,
but also that despite there being one million people still displaced, there is a declining pool of refugees
wishing to return). Many official returns are in fact property swaps, while violence and intimidation
continue to confront the few genuine returnees. See Anes Alic, Better Late than Never, TRANSITIONS
ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2003, at http://www.tol.cz (describing the obstacles to refugee returns in Muslim-
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Received opinion views Bosnia as fundamentally unstable: susceptible to
shocks from other regional disputes9 and sustainable only as long as foreign
power intervenes.10 Perhaps most critically, the international effort has largely
failed to create a real popular commitment to the project of integration among
Bosnia's people,'1 instead making the limited progress it has by imposing
controlled Donji Vakuf); Dragan Stanimirovic, War on a Different Front, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Mar. 4,
2003, at http://www.tol.cz (describing attacks on Muslims returning to the Republika Srpska and
attempts to prevent the rebuilding of mosques). For examples of the debilitating effects of Dayton
Bosnia's dysfunction, see Nicholas Wood, Mostar Journal: An Effort To Unify a Bosnian City
Multiplies Frictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at A4 (noting the near-total separation and duplication
of institutions in Croat West Mostar and Muslim East Mostar and efforts to unify the two areas); Anes
Alic, Bridge of Despair in Disrepair, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2003, at http://www.tol.cz
(describing how political divisions and funding shortfalls prevent repair of the historic Sokovolid
Bridge, calling it a "victim [of] Bosnia's brittle peace"). See also INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 7
(describing period through 1999); Timothy William Waters, The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords,
Property Disputes, and the Bosnia's Real Constitution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517 (1999) (same). High
unemployment, a moribund economy, and corruption might also be noted. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2003 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27829.htm;
Loza, supra note 5. Some of these failings are embedded in the constitutional structure. See Waters,
supra.
9. Several OHR and OSCE officials noted that many Serb politicians see an eventual
settlement in Kosovo as their opportunity to press for the separation of the Republika Srpska-which
implies that the sentiment for separation still exists-or at least brake further integration. Interview with
anonymous Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) official in Banja Luka, Bosn.
& Herz. (Mar. 12-13, 2004); Interview with anonymous OSCE official in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz.
(Mar. 12, 2004); Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13,
2004); Interviews with two anonymous OHR officials, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004).
10. In the early post-Dayton period, observers believed that withdrawal might lead to
immediate war; now most believe it might lead to war only if the Muslims refuse to accept a Serb or
Croat secession. Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?, supra note 5. Cf. Patrick Moore, The Mixed
Record of Balkan Protectorates, RFE/RL BALKAN REP., May 2, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/2003/05/13-020503.asp ("In Bosnia ... foreign experts and
local opinion polls generally agree that the departure of the foreigners would sooner or later result in a
resumption of conflict."). Interview with anonymous Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) official, in Sarajevo (Mar. 12, 2004)Even those who reject this view because they think Bosnia
is now not only militarily but politically stable should see Part V, infra, concerning the doctrinal
consequences of stability.
11. Real popular support for the integrationist project is neither totally absent nor impossible
in the future, but even advocates of integration acknowledge that it is very weak at present. See, e.g.,
Midhat Izmirlija & Leila Balid, Situations, Perspectives and Possibilities for Amendment of the Dayton
Constitution, in EIGHT YEARS OF DAYTON BiH: NEW VISIONS FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA?
ALTERNATIVE CONFERENCE 120, 136 & n.63 (noting that "the basic problem of the structure of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a normal European state are [sic] not complicated amendment procedure regulated
by the Constitution, but the fact that many citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not consider it their
homeland"); Interview with anonymous OHR official, Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004)
(noting that in the entire period since the war ended, "I have not seen a single genuine act of
reconciliation"). But see Interview with Republika Srpska lawyer, Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13,
2004) ("It has gotten better. Three years ago, Serb sportsmen who played for BiH teams were called
traitors; now, no one cares.").
Izmirlija and Balid also note that in a survey administered to elementary school students in
Sarajevo, Banja Luka and 2epde, the question "what is your state?" received completely different
responses: "In Sarajevo the answer was Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Banja Luka, Serbia and Montenegro
and in 2epde, Croatia." (internal citation omitted). See also Wood, supra note 8 ("[L]ocal analysts and
politicians concede that many Bosnians, particularly Serbs and Croats, are far from identifying with the
state that the international officials are trying to build for them."). According to some reports, most
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats feel no loyalty to Bosnia. Id. (noting the statements of a Bosnian
journalist: "They do not have the feeling that they belong to this state. Serbs look over the Drina to
Belgrade, and Croats to Zagreb; foreigners don't understand that."). See also Julian Braithwaite, Can the
Nationalists Deliver?, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Mar. 11, 2003, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/
bcr3_200303413_3_eng.txt ("It is still the case today that most Bosnian Serbs and probably a majority
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reforms and relying on the acquiescence that the weak show before the
strong. 12 Bosnia remains at best an inchoate, not-yet success: a fragile, fictive,
even failed state,' 3 held together by outsiders' weapons, outsiders' gold, and
of Bosnian Croats do not believe in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and vote accordingly. Yet no state can succeed
in the long-term if the majority of its citizens do not support it."); Nerma Jelacic & Gordana Katana,
Bosnia: Greater Serbia Dream Lives On, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Aug. 29, 2003,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl? archive/bcr3/bcr3_200308456-2_eng.txt ("[Tihe opinions held by the
citizens and politicians of RS [Republika Srpska] are a stark reminder that the international community
has a long and difficult road ahead if it pursues a unified Bosnia.").
In all elections since the war, the wartime nationalist parties have received either majorities or
pluralities, and it is widely supposed that the international community actively intervened to cobble
together the one non-nationalist postwar government, the Alliance for Change. See, e.g., Braithwaite,
supra; Jelacic & Katana, supra; Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 67 (noting Richard Holbrooke's
threats that the United States would withhold aid from nationalist governments and the OSCE's funding
of election posters asking Bosnians to "Vote for Change"); Loza, supra note 5 (discussing the coalition
formed after "months of Western-sponsored post-electoral engineering in the aftermath of the November
2000 elections"); Senad Slatina, Bosnia: Ethnic Divide Widens as Elections Loom, BALKAN CRISIS REP.,
Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr2/bcr2_20020809_4_eng.txt. The October 2002
elections returned nationalists to power, which was seen as a defeat for the international community's
policy of supporting integrationist parties. See Patrick Moore, Final Tally Confirms Nationalist Win in
Bosnia, RFE/RL REPORT, Oct. 21, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ 2002/10/4-SEE/see-21 1002.asp;
Sead Numanovic & Gordana Katana, Bosnia: Nationalists Alarm West, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Jan. 9,
2003, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/ bcr3/bcr3_200301_396_3_eng.txt (discussing negotiations
leading to the nationalist parties' return to power, and noting the absolute majorities held by those
parties or their allies in all cantons); Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Deciphering the Bosnian Elections, Oct.
2002, CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUDIES, at http://www.ceps.be/ Article.php?articleid=194. But see
Nicholas Wood, Nationalists Take Lead in Bosnian Elections: US., Others Pushed for Moderate
Parties, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at A17 (noting voters did not necessarily favor return to wartime
policies). Nothing I argue means to suggest that the international community ought to support or impose
non-integrative policies against the wishes of the Bosnian people; on the contrary, I argue only that we
ought to discern what their wishes are, and respect them.
12. See, e.g., Anes Alic, A Tax Reform for Bosnia, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2004, at
http://www.tol.cz (discussing how the "chronology of the making of the [new tax] law shows that it took
immense pressure and financial threats from the international community for the reforms to see the light
of day"); Jelacic & Katana, supra note 11 ("The only steps towards integration, such as common
passports and car license plates, have been made at the insistence of the international community."). I do
not suggest that all parties oppose OHR policy-that is not true. I only suggest that acquiescence under
pressure tells us little about Bosnians' preferences one way or the other.
13. There is a rich literature on failed states. See, e.g., Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst,
Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 84 (describing
the need for a new term "to express the idea that a state's fundamental institutions have so deteriorated
that it needs long-term external help, not to institutionalize foreign control but to create stronger
domestic institutions capable of self-government" and a "clear procedure for handling a failed state" and
its relationship to the international community); Andrew J. Harris, Facing the Challenges of Military-
Civil Cooperation in Complex Emergencies, DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFF. STRATEGIC POL'Y, Oct. 2000, at
11 ("[Tlhe rise of 'failed' states is a recent phenomenon. 'Failed' states are characterized by a
progressive breakdown of state mechanisms, multiple armed factions exercising control over parts of the
formerly national territory, and a breakdown of control within military factions."). Certainly Bosnia does
not exhibit the kind of chaos that characterizes classic failed states like Somalia. Cf Gerry J. Simpson,
The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255,
256 (1996) (defining a failed state as "a state in which sovereignty has been radically fragmented by
revolutionary chaos such that not even the most skeletal civil administration remains"-a definition
which would exclude both Bosnia today and Bosnia during the period of its war, when three separate
civil-military authorities exercised control on various parts of its territory); Robert 1. Rotberg, Failed
States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jul./Aug. 2002, at 127 (not considering Bosnia presently a
failed state but calling it an example of a state that had "lapse[d] and then [was] restored to various
degrees of health"); Kenneth M. Pollack, After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction ofIraq, Jan. 12,
2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040109faupdate83175/kenneth-m-pollack/after-saddam-assessing
-the-reconstruction-of-iraq.html (arguing that "Bosnia is no one's idea of a success story, and it is
unclear when it ever will be, but it is also unquestionably better off today than it was prior to the
international intervention" and calling Bosnia "a country not capable of surviving on its own but not tom
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outsiders' will.' 4 As has been evident to all, the will is weakening, and the
gold is running out.15 Soon, perhaps, only the weapons will remain.'
Few would argue that this can continue. In the past year, numerous
observers have acknowledged the failings of the current dispensation.' 7 In this
apart by violence" in contradistinction to 1970s and 1980s Lebanon). However, it seems reasonable to
say that any state, in the entire period following the complete collapse of central control during a
fractious and protracted conflict, that is unable to maintain its own territorial integrity or institutions
without continuous external pressure and support, and lacks legitimacy with its own population, may
reasonably be called a "failed" or "failing" state-at least in the narrow sense that it is not (yet)
succeeding. Cf Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case
for American Empire, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 2 (including Bosnia in a discussion of failed
states, and noting that "nation builders are making some headway but are not yet successful enough to
withdraw"). Unless we limit the category of "failed states" to these entities in which warfare is currently
ongoing, Bosnia seems a reasonable candidate for the description. Indeed, as noted already, the
international community's own chief administrator in Bosnia, Wolfgang Petritsch, wrote an editorial
concerning Bosnia entitled How to Resuscitate a Failed State. See Petritsch, supra note 5. What
separates Bosnia today from classic "failed state" status is our intervention; absent that intervention,
which both creates and sustains the few functioning institutions of statehood, Bosnia would be a failure.
That begs the question: is continuing intervention justified-and if so, what kind of intervention?
14. See Jelacic & Katana, supra note I1 (quoting twenty-three-year-old electrician Sasa
Boijanovic as saying that "[i]t should be clear to everyone that [Bosnia-Herzegovina] is a fake country
created by the international community").
15. See Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 63 (noting that "[t]he predicament of Bosnia, as
Lord Ashdown explained in his Christmas speech, is that it is 'a country running out of time,' a country
that 'has been on economic life-support systems for years, and those life-support systems are being
switched off one by one . . ."'); Patrick Moore, International Mediator Calls for Self-Help in Bosnia,
RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/4-see/see-271003.asp (noting
continued dependency on the international community and the decline in international funding
commitments). Whatever the future of American and other international assistance, however, it is
unlikely that the European Union would entirely withdraw support. Bosnia will likely continue to
receive-and to require-significant economic support for years to come.
16. These weapons are increasingly Europe's, not America's. See, e.g., Patrick Moore,
Despite Possible Political Ramifications?, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Sept. 17, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/09/4-sec/sec-170903.asp (noting U.S. State Department concerns
about the implications of a U.S. withdrawal, including the EU's inability to ensure military security);
Patrick Moore, EU Agrees to NATO Role in Bosnian Peacekeeping, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Apr. 7, 2004,
http://www.referl.org/newsline/2004/04/4-see/see-070404.asp (noting that a 7,000-strong EU force will
replace the current NATO mission, but that NATO will retain some authority for pursuing war
criminals, fighting terrorism, and training, and that NATO or the United States will maintain a force
numbering "in the hundreds"); Patrick Moore, Is the US. Planning To Pull Its Troops out of the
Balkans, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Sep. 17, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/09/4-see/see-
170903.asp (reporting that senior U.S. Army officers are pressing for full withdrawal of U.S. troops,
including those in Bosnia and Kosovo, while current foreign military strength in Bosnia remains at about
12,000). See also Patrick Moore, Bosnian Serbs Take Step Toward Military Reform, RFE/RL NEWSLINE,
Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/12/4-SEE/see-01 1203.asp (noting that "[c]ritics [of
plans for a joint military force] charge that the changes are cosmetic and will not substantially alter the
fact that Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian leaders retain effective control of what remain in practice three
separate, ethnically based armies ... [and] that each of the three members of the presidency may block
any decision by that body"). But some international officials suggest that the new joint defense
mechanisms do represent a significant integrative step, and that the planned EU presence would not
seriously jeopardize the military stability of the territory. Interview with anonymous OHR official, in
Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OHR official, in
Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in
Sarajevo (Mar. 12, 2004), supra note 10.
17. See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, BOSNIA'S NATIONALIST GOVERNMENTS: PADDY ASHDOWN
AND THE PARADOXES OF STATE BUILDING (2003), http://www.crisisweb.org/home/
index.cfm?id+1474&=l; Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 63; Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?,
supra note 5. One recent report noted:
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the picture is . . . grim. There is urgent need for a new
constitution. The existing constitutional order was imposed by the U.S.-brokered Dayton
agreement ... [but] sanctioned a divided state hamstrung by layers of overlapping and
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tenuous context, the rights of the former combatant parties-the Muslims (or
Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats of Bosnia's-to determine their own political
destinies are highly contested; to paraphrase Clausewitz, politics in Bosnia
remain a continuation of war by other means, even as Bosnia exhibits the
contours of a functioning democracy.' 9 The legal and political commitments
of members of these groups and the international community (especially the
United States, the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union) center on
tensions between a preference for unity and integration on one hand, and for
separateness or resistance to further integration on the other. Though agreeing
on little else, almost all sides view the conflicting separatist and integrationist
imperatives of the current constitutional dispensation as dysfunctional, and
many expect thorough change, though in radically different directions.2 ° Yet
because of the opaque and unaccountable political structure imposed and
policed by the OHR, internal debate on opposition to integration or support
for separation is marginalized21 and (probably) radically constrained.22 In turn,
contradictory constitutions, laws and administrations. The current dysfunction is
dangerous and expensive. And no sober mind would pull NATO troops out until it is
fixed.
Laura Silber, Bush Has Neglected the Balkans For Too Long, A Ticking Time Bomb, INT'L HERALD
TRB., Jan. 13, 2004, at 7.
18. Not everyone in Bosnia belongs to these groups: there are also Albanians, Czechs,
Gypsies, Jews, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Ruthenians, Vlachs, Ukrainians, and many other groups, as
well as those who identify themselves as Yugoslavs, Bosnians, or of mixed heritage or no ethnicity.
Whatever the complications and multiplicities, however, the great majority of the state's citizens
embrace or accept a principal ethnic identity located within one of the three main groups. These group
identities, regardless of their provenance and historical contingency, have been and seem set to remain
highly salient in contemporary Bosnian society and politics.
19. The October 2002 elections were declared "free and fair" and Bosnia was admitted to the
Council of Europe that same month. Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 72.
20. See, e.g., Woodard, supra note 7, at I ("'The problem is that we're all still not pulling in
the same direction,' says [Jakob] Finci, [head of Bosnia's Jewish community and] director of the
country's new civil service agency. 'I don't think that everybody has given up on the idea of splitting
Bosnia into two or three parts."'); Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?, supra note 5 (describing four
different approaches to reform-increased powers for the OHR, reduced powers for the OHR, a
constitutional convention to replace Dayton, and partition-and noting that "[w]hat the models have in
common is the assumption that Dayton has turned into a straightjacket"); Sead Numanovic & Gordana
Katana, supra note 11 (noting that "[t]he SDA [The Party of Democratic Action] advocates a much
more centralized state," the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] seeks "to preserve [the Republika Srpska]
as a separate, Serb-dominated entity linked as closely as possible to Serbia proper," and "the HDZ
[Croatian Democratic Union] still dreams about an exclusive, ethically pure Croat region in [Bosnia]").
The diversity of viewpoints and "comprehensive distrust of political institutions" among Bosnia's
different ethnic groups was bome out in a United Nations Development Programme:
Bosniaks most frequently saw Bosnia as a state of citizens and nationalities with equal
rights, the way it was before the war. The majority of Croats still regard their main
political interests the creation of a third, separate Bosnian Croat entity. Serbs, meanwhile,
either back independence for Republika Srpska or want it to be annexed to Serbia.
Senad Slatina, Bosnia: Ethnic Divide Widens as Elections Loom, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Aug. 9, 2002,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr2/bcr2_20020809_4eng.txt. Other survey results have
indicated that, in the Republika Srpska, indicted war criminals Ratko Mladid and Radovan Karad~id
head the list of "most trusted personalities," the SDS "remains far and away the most popular party, with
twice the support of its nearest rival," and that thirty-seven percent "think the [Federation] presents a
threat" compared to nineteen percent of respondents in the Federation thinking the same about the
Republika Srpska. MARK THOMPSON, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, SOUTH
EASTERN EUROPE: NEW MEANS FOR REGIONAL ANALYSIS 6 (2002),
http://www.idea.intbalkans/policy brief balkans_2.pdf.
21. See Anes Alic, Living in a Paradox, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2003, at
http://www.tol.cz ("Until very recently ...ordinary Bosnians were almost entirely absent from the
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the interests and wishes of the people living in Bosnia are difficult to
discern-all as a consequence of the international community's own
preferential policies.
How then can we understand, predict, or advocate for systemic change
in this highly contested terrain? Indeed, for what should we advocate? In
Bosnia's recent history, the accepted models for assessing claims to form new
states--especially self-determination doctrines-proved ineffective in
mediating that process, and different (if also imperfect) models were
developed on the fly. Because of those changes, present claims, seen as weak
within a self-determination framework, may prove more persuasive from other
legal and political perspectives.
This Article is a political and moral analysis of legal doctrine: it asks
which policies on Bosnia are somehow incumbent upon us for legal reasons,
and which are more a matter of our moral sense and our political preferences.
By considering not what we should have done, but what the implications of
the war, the peace, and our changing commitments have been, it asks if one
set of claims about Bosnia's future has an arguably stronger legal case, or
ought to. By focusing the surface analysis on doctrine, I do not intend to
exclude from consideration the real, the contingent, and the political. On the
contrary, I assume that these factors, not formal doctrinal postulates, most
directly govern the processes of territorial change, and I address moral or
political considerations that materially affect the possible outcome in law. To
this end, I examine the real limitations and possibilities defined by the
historically created political situation-the changes wrought by war and
peace-not only to see how they alter the doctrines, but also to ask how our
doctrinal commitments in turn delimit contemporary political choices. In other
debate."); Roberto Belloni, Dubious Democracy by Fiat, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Aug. 20, 2003, at
http://www.tol.cz ("Conspicuously absent [from reform debates] are Bosnians themselves, and there is
little discussion about the reactions of local politicians, intellectuals, and civil society activists. Most of
the talk is centered on well-intentioned foreign observers.").
22. The OHR regularly removes elected and appointed officials from office for a variety of
reasons, usually centering on an ill-defined opposition to commitments under the Dayton Accords; over
100 officials had been removed from office by the end of 2002. Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 63-69.
The OHR is also empowered to impose legislation and administrative regulations by fiat, and is not
accountable to any domestic body for its decisions. See id. at 61 ("In Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders
do more than participate in shaping the political agenda .... [O]utsiders actually set that agenda, impose
it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse to implement it."). See also Patrick Moore, High
Representative Cuts Off Funds to Bosnian Serb Party, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Apr. 5, 2004,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/04/050404.asp (noting recent decisions by the OHR to cut off funds
to the main Croat and Serb nationalist parties, the latter for allegedly providing financial support to
Radovan Karadi ). Though difficult to demonstrate, it also is widely supposed that the United States,
the European Union, and other international actors have exercised considerable pressure on Bosnian
political parties after each election cycle in an effort to ensure particular government coalitions-and
that the OHR's policies on removing officials are consonant with those efforts. See, e.g., Knaus &
Martin, supra note 6, at 67. One international official noted that "no [local] politician would be so
unsubtle as to directly oppose Partnership for Peace [and the accompanying military integration]."
Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9. The
international community also exercises considerable oversight of the media, and has on occasion
actively intervened, even taking control of broadcast facilities. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 11
(noting "comprehensive international attempts to reorganize their media sectors along democratic
lines"). I do not mean to suggest, however, that media outlets are as explicitly constrained as politicians
in their expressions of opposition to international policy. There is lively debate in the Bosnian media-
including, as shown above, much evidence of the extremely weak popular commitment to Bosnian state
institutions.
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words, I ask how what we may call law-in-politics defines and sometimes
displaces the seemingly compelling claims of moral justice. Existing self-
determination doctrine is unable to explain or guide our policy choices, in
Bosnia or more broadly, but exploring its political and moral limits gives us a
hint of the alternative, however unpalatable.
The argument runs as follows: Part II sketches the historical and
contemporary doctrinal structures, showing that Bosnia's constituent nations
had and have few grounds for a conventional self-determination claim. Part III
examines how Bosnia itself came to be recognized as a claimant to statehood
during Yugoslavia's dissolution, noting features of that process that bear on
potential claims today. Part IV outlines how demographic shifts and new
internal boundaries created by the war make potential secessionist claims
today more comprehensible under the conventional doctrines, and it also
considers some obvious moral objections. Extending this argument, Part V
revises the theory of self-determination, examining how its traditionally
conservative privileging of the status quo plays out in surprising ways in
stabilized post-conflict societies. Part VI then revisits the process of Bosnia's
recognition in light of this theoretical and doctrinal revision, and concludes by
suggesting a plausible, even preferable, alternative given the international
community's increasing doctrinal commitment to democracy. In doing so, the
Article also identifies the rhetorical and doctrinal luster that policy would
likely take on-not a right of self-determination, but a public logic of state
failure, territorial succession, democratic legitimacy, and recognition for novel
claimants to statehood that will inevitably have implications for the re-
conceptualization of claims to state formation elsewhere.
II. DEFINITIONS, DEFORMATIONS, AND LIMITS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Before examining the specific claims that have been or might now be
made in the Bosnian context, let us look briefly at the basic doctrinal structure
to see how it conceives the shape of self-determination. This conception
should have or could have guided the choices of the international community
in its policies towards Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. This cursory overview
aims simply to show that contemporary doctrines provide little room for
finding a right of self-determination in the nations of Bosnia, before turning to
the alternative ways the problem has been-and can be-viewed. 23
23. For thorough reviews of self-determination in law and politics, see ANTONIO CASSESE,
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS, chs. 3-4
(1996); MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert McCorquodale ed., 2000); THE SELF-DETERMNATION
OF PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (Wolfgang
Danspeckgruber ed., 2002). See also Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991) (laying out the orthodox view of self-determination law
with an eye to critiquing its basic assumption of a conflict between self-determination and territorial
integrity); Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist
Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1998); Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the
Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1996); Patrick Thomberry, Self-Determination,
Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 867 (1989)
(reviewing the state of the law just prior to the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict).
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Wilsonian Origins. Rooted in the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and
nineteenth century nationalism,24 self-determination's first major modern
incarnation appeared in Woodrow Wilson's proposals for reorganizing the
defeated Central Powers following the First World War. 5 Wilson's
formulation recognized the right of ethnic groups to form states on the
territories they inhabited, without relying on existing borders, and explicitly
rejected subordination of people's interests to territorial concerns.26 Wilsonian
self-determination gave identifiable ethnic groups the right to form states,
ensured minority rights for members of those groups not included in new
states, and used plebiscites to decide difficult border disputes.27
Yet, a Wilsonian system poses serious problems of arbitrariness28-and
though ostensibly based on a given people's ethnic or affinitive qualities, it
arguably makes ultimate decisions concerning self-determination on an
implicitly territorial basis.29 The Wilsonian system does not solve the formal
problem of distinguishing minorities from peoples; arguably, it defines the
problem into existence in the first place. Moreover, in so doing, Wilsonianism
radically threatens the status quo of state borders.
Classical Decolonial Orthodoxy. The Wilsonian conception of ethnic
self-determination was eclipsed in the post-World War II era by a variant
influenced by Leninism,30 namely decolonization. Though self-determination
had become a foundational principle of the world legal-political order, and
was cited in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter)
as one of the purposes of the United Nations, the Wilsonian model was
superceded b' a commitment to decolonization that defined self-determination
territorially. 7
In the new model, developed in the U.N. Charter, a series of U.N.
General Assembly resolutions, and treaties (such as the human rights
covenants 32 and the Helsinki Accords33), "peoples" determined their political
24. See THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 2-14
(1997).
25. CASSESE, supra note 23, at 19-26; Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and
the Versailles Settlement, 43 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 99 (1994).
26. See HANNUM, supra note 23, at 27-28. See generally Whelan, supra note 25.
27. Whelan, supra note 25, at 100-01.
28. See IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1956) ("Nearly forty
years ago, a Professor of Political Science, who was also President of the United States, President
Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a sensible
proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface, it seemed reasonable: let the people
decide. It was in fact ridiculous, because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the
people.").
29. Inherent difficulties with the Wilsonian approach have been identified:
[T]he problem of identifying peoples under the Wilsonian principle is . . . a simple
question of line-drawing. Depending on where the dividing line is drawn, an ethnic,
religious or other community aspiring to nationhood can become either a 'people',
entitled to full self-government, or a minority, with only the minimal rights accorded to
members of what was, in the Versailles scheme, a residual category
Whelan, supra note 25, at 102-03.
30. See CASSESE, supra note 23, at 14-19.
31. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1(2). See also Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the
Right To Secede, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2003, at 5, 6.
32. The 1966 human rights covenants declare a right to self-determination for all peoples.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23,
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status, but within pre-defined borders. The so-called "salt-water thesis" of
Resolution 1541 (XV) limits states' obligations under the Charter to
"territory [ies] which [are] geographically separate and .. distinct ethnically
and/or culturally from the country administering [them]. ' 4 In practice, this
enabled colonies35 to head off any threat to their existing territorial integrity.
Once a colony achieved independence, no further exercise of the right was
needed, or possible. 36 The ancient doctrine of uti possidetis37 was invoked
23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95-2, at 13, 13 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5
[hereinafter ICESCR]. However, the ICCPR addresses minority rights separately and does not grant
them a right to self-determination. ICCPR, supra, art. 27, S. EXEC. DOc. E, 95-2, at 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at
179. The situation has been described as follows:
The right of self-determination in the Covenants is universal. The text and traveaux
support the view that the Covenants reach beyond the colonial situation ... [but]
[s]ections of the people-minorities-enjoy more limited rights than the people itself...
. The essence [of self-determination] is political control .... The rights of minorities are
enumerated and finite, and do not include political control.
Thomberry, supra note 23, at 878, 880. A right of self-determination could only be found as a remedy
when states fail to observe even the minimum duty of tolerance and non-interference necessary to allow
a group's continued existence. Id. at 881. See also CASSESE, supra note 23, at 61-62.
33. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, princ.
VIII, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323, 326 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Accords] ("By virtue of the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to
determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external
interference, and to pursue as they wish their political ... development."). However, this right does not
extend to minorities:
[P]articipating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of
persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full
opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will,
in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.
Id. princ. VII, 325. See also J.A. Laponce, National Self-Determination and Referendums: The Case for
Territorial Revisionism, 7 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 33, 36-37 (2001) (arguing that the Helsinki Act
favors territorial integrity to the detriment of group-based claims for territorial reformation).
34. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, princ. IV, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
States have a "reporting obligation" to provide information to the United Nations on territories
possessed of self-determining peoples. They do not have any such obligation regarding populations of
territories not meeting the "salt-water test."
35. See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 182-83 ("[ljntemational law currently supports the
position that anti-colonial movements can invoke the right of self-determination, but not groups seeking
to secede from established states.").
36. Territorial alterations are still possible, but only consensually: the will of the whole people
of a pre-defined territory would have to consent to a change in the territory, not just a territorially
discrete segment of the people.
37. The doctrine of uti possidetis juris, from the Latin maxim uti possidetis ita possidetis
("have what you have had") first appeared as a means to limit border disputes arising out of the wave of
independence movements in Latin America. Uti possidetis provided that the provincial and
administrative borders of Spain's possessions would be respected as the new states' frontiers. Later, the
principle was adopted for African decolonization. See generally SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING
BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 10-137 (2002); Ratner, supra note
23, at 592-601. The International Court of Justice has suggested that uti possitetis is of general
applicability when new states are formed, at least out of colonies. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali),
1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute]. Application of uti possidetis, even in the
African and Latin American contexts, has been inconsistent. See Robert McCorquodale, Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 857, 881-82 (1994) (citing the
incorporation of British Togo into Ghana, the merging of British and Italian Somaliland, the recognition
of Belize's independence vis-A-vis Guatemala, and the incorporation of Goa into India). Nonetheless, uti
possidetis is also a "limitation on the right of self-determination. However, it is relevant only in those
very few situations when the claimed exercise of the fight is for secession and that secession has an
effect on a colonial boundary." Id. See also Robert McCorquodale & Raul Pangalangan, Pushing Back
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both to convert former colonial boundaries into international frontiers and to
forestall any further secession from newly independent territories. 38 Self-
determination had become a legal principle, but stripped of its substantive,
Wilsonian focus on ethnicity; it left a right for colonies to become states, but
39
nothing more.
Secession. Because of this history, self-determination is often thought of
as the right of colonial territories to independence. Though the relevant legal
instruments allow various levels of association between a self-determining
people and their present ruler, including integration or autonomy,40 the self-
determining group decides what level of association it desires, if any. This
discretion is limited to the whole population of a given territory, defined as a
self-determining people. For other groups, the doctrinal consensus holds that
there is no right to self-determination, except in narrow circumstances that
adhere, not to the nature of the group, but to its contingent situation vis-A-vis
an oppressive ruler. Only peoples under colonial or alien rule, or subjected to
extreme persecution such as genocide, may make a claim of secession by
right;41 in all other cases, secession is considered a political matter, neither
required nor forbidden. Nonetheless, the strong priority given to territorial
integrity in the international system means that involuntary division of a state
is effectively barred and almost never recognized.
Nations and Self-Determination. In recent decades and especially since
the end of the Cold War, various groups have attempted to expand the concept
of "peoples endowed with self-determination" to include nations, ethnicities,
and national minorities-in effect, to return to a more Wilsonian idea of self-
42determination. Claims outside the colonial context, however, brunt directly
the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 867, 887-88 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 23, at 595-96.
39. Cf id. at 605-07 (discussing the inappositeness of domestic administrative borders for
international demarcation); id at 624 (arguing that not engaging the territorial question may perpetuate
"a formalized self-determination that enables a new state to form along the administrative lines of the
old territorial unit but neglects the underlying territorial issues that prompted the dissatisfaction in the
first place, and perhaps lays the groundwork for a new round of interstate conflicts and attempted
secessions").
40. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 34, print. VI, at 29 ("A Non-Self-Governing
Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a
sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an
independent State."); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 8, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration
on Friendly Relations] ("The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right to self-determination by that people.").
41. A right of self-determination could only be found as a remedy when states fail to observe
even the minimum duty of tolerance and non-interference necessary to allow a group's continued
existence. Thornberry, supra note 23, at 881. See also Derege Demissie, Note, Self-Determination
Including Secession vs. the Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165, 169-70 & n.24 (1996) ("To invoke the right to secession from an
existing state is a misapplication of the right to self-determination. However, where the territorial
integrity is a legal fiction that disguises colonial and alien domination, the subjected people are entitled
to exercise their right to self-determination with all its consequences."). But see Gaetano Pentassuglia,
State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal View, 9 INT'L J.
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 303, 310-12 (2002) (interpreting secession from an oppressive state as not
implicating the right of self-determination).
42. See generally HANNUM, supra note 23. Cf Laurence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-
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up against the restrictively defined conception of self-determination, which
does not elaborate the same strong right of self-determination for sub-
populations of states as it does for state populations as a whole.a3 Moreover,
contemporary claims have been advanced in a radically different and less
opportune political context: whereas colonial self-determination forced distant
overlords to withdraw from overseas empires, claims by nations require
integral states to be divided.44 Efforts to claim a right of self-determination for
nations have therefore been singularly unsuccessful.
A Democratic Right? A recent trend with greater traction has been the
re-expression of self-determination as a right to internal democracy. 45 Self-
determination's commitment to ending alien, imposed rule seems logically
consistent with giving full and free expression to the population's will in
organizing the state. This logic in turn found reinforcement in U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 2625, which, in reaffirming states' territorial integrity,
adds this saving limitation:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance
with the principle of. . .self-determination of peoples .. . and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour,"
This arguably allows the exercise of self-determination by a sub-population
when the state fails to provide equal rights of political participation to ethnic
and religious minorities; "[t]he guarantee of integrity is contingent upon the
existence of representative government., 4 7 Yet, many scholars believe this
exception is very narrow and limited to the most repressive and racist
48regimes . Certainly state practice, even with the recrudescence of democraticregimes since the late 1970s, would not support a broad reading.4 9 This
Determination Law to Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 133, 175 (1995) (discussing the "Wilsonian" nature of claims in the Soviet and Yugoslav
collapses).
43. As Thomberry explains:
The restrictive view of the non-applicability of self-determination to minority groups is
strengthened by a consideration of General Assembly Resolution 1514-the Colonial
declaration. The holder of the right of self-determination is, once more, declared to be the
people. The meaning of the term 'people' is conditioned by repeated references to
colonialism .... The effect is that colonial boundaries function as the boundaries of the
emerging States. Minorities, therefore, may not secede from States-at least,
international law gives them no right to do so. The logic of the resolution is relatively
simple: peoples hold the right of self-determination; a people is the whole people of a
territory; a people exercises its right through the achievement of independence.
Thomberry, supra note 23, at 874-75. See also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 34, at 66.
44. See Demissie, supra note 41, at 170.
45. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46 (1992).
46. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 40, at 124 (emphasis added).
47. Thomberry, supra note 23, at 876.
48. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 23, at 109-15; Thomberry, supra note 23, at 876
(attributing this view to Antonio Cassese and Michala Pomerance).
49. The Canadian Supreme Court's extraordinary judgment in Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, relied explicitly on the pre-existing democratic foundations of Canada in
allowing the possibility that the rest of the federation might have to negotiate in good faith with Quebec
if the province expressed a clear commitment to secession. State practice elsewhere hardly supports
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emerging right may validate a claim for democracy by the whole population
of a state, but not necessarily a sub-group.
Bosnia in the Contemporary Doctrinal Field. In the present Bosnian
context, a claim to self-determination on the basis of national or ethnic status
seems highly implausible. There is simply too much weight of opinion and
practice against the proposition that anything other than the whole population
of Bosnia's territory is a "people," although the highly autonomous, ethnically
segregated political structures created by the war and the Dayton Accords
militate against a claim of present persecution. It seems, then, that classical
self-determination doctrines-too narrow to apply to ethnic sub-populations
of a territorially contiguous, independent, European state--do not offer much
hope to the would-be Muslim, Serb, or Croat secessionists in post-Dayton
Bosnia.
Indeed, given the doctrine's emphasis on territorial integrity, it is unclear
just how Bosnia itself was able to leave the internationally recognized
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. Yet, Bosnia was able to
secede--or rather, its status as a sovereign and independent state was
universally recognized. This is not, in doctrine and rhetoric, the same thing.
To see how Bosnia became independent, and to see what options this event
may have created for parties that might wish to secede from Bosnia in the
future, we turn first to the closing days of Yugoslavia, as it began to dissolve.
III. "A DESTRUCTION IN PROGRESS": DISSOLUTION, CREATION, AND
CONTROL IN YUGOSLAVIA
By 1990, Yugoslavia was in crisis, its economy in collapse, and its
central authorities increasingly paralyzed, unable or unwilling to cooperate in
a constitutional and political structure that had devolved power to six
republics and two provinces after Tito's death in 1981.50 That structure also
encouraged the process by which individual republican and provincial elites
became increasingly identified as political proxies for nascent or resurgent
national communities.51 Central control of security began to break down. By
the middle of 1991, armed conflict began, first in Slovenia, then in Croatia. 52
even this formulation. See LALONDE, supra note 37, at 223-29.
50. Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Serbia's two autonomous
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo each had a vote on the collective presidency established by the
1974 Yugoslav constitution.
51. As one scholar from the region notes:
The deteriorating economic situation resulting from communist mismanagement
exacerbated ethnic tensions ....
The principal [sic] of limited sovereignty-by which some national sovereign rights were
surrendered to the federal state so that... economic, financial, and foreign policy as well
as the military were within the competence of the federation-was replaced by the
principle of complete sovereignty, with each nation bearing exclusive responsibility for
its own fate.
Dutan Ne~ak, Historical Elements for Understanding the "Yugoslav Question," in YUGOSLAVIA, THE
FORMER AND FUTURE: REFLECTIONS BY SCHOLARS FROM THE REGION 13, 27 (Payam Akhavan & Robert
Howse eds., 1995) [hereinafter YUGOSLAVIA, THE FORMER AND FUTURE].
52. My argument does not rely on any particular history about the origins of the various
groups in Bosnia, any particular belief about how harmoniously or fractiously those peoples co-existed
prior to the war, or any particular theory as to why the conflict broke out. It is grounded on an estimate
of the present consequences of the war and the peace for people's political valuations; as I argued in an
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earlier article, "it relies on a recognition that the presently realized ethnic division is highly salient and
unlikely to recede to any meaningful degree." Waters, supra note 8, at 523 n. 15.
Bosnia and Herzegovina have long been identifiable geographical and political regions, though
with various borders. An independent Bosnian kingdom existed in the Middle Ages, and following their
conquest by the Ottomans, Bosnia and Herzegovina figured as internal units in that empire; most of their
present borders date from the late Ottoman period. The Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 1878 until the end of the First World War. In independent royal Yugoslavia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina had no separate political identity, but following the Second World War, Tito's
Communist Yugoslavia included a separate Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of six
constituent federal republics.
Most of Bosnia's population has adhered to one of three religions since the Ottoman conquest:
Orthodoxy, Catholicism, or Sunni Islam. From the nineteenth century, the Orthodox and Catholic
populations increasingly identified themselves as Serbs and Croats, respectively; a specifically Bosnian
Muslim national identity developed somewhat later. The relative proportions of nominal Orthodox
Christians, Catholics, and Muslims have changed considerably over the centuries; in the late Communist
era, the proportions were roughly forty-four percent Muslim, thirty-four percent Serb, and seventeen
percent Croat. Although there are small regional variations, all the principal groups in Bosnia speak
mutually intelligible dialects of Serbo-Croatian, with no correspondence between language variation and
confession. Historically, relations between the groups were not particularly strained, with the notable
exception of extreme inter-ethnic violence during the Second World War that probably accounted for
most of the deaths there during that period. Post-war Bosnia had relatively high rates of intermarriage,
Communist party membership, and persons identifying themselves as "Yugoslav" during the
Communist period. National identity and culture were promoted, but expression of nationalist political
sentiment was restricted.
By the late Communist period, especially following the death of Tito in 1981, the republics of
Yugoslavia had increasing economic and political autonomy, while at the same time the formerly
prosperous country descended into economic paralysis. In the 1980s, some Serbs in particular became
increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as their marginalization in areas outside Serbia, especially
Kosovo. By the late 1980s, nationalists had become increasingly prominent within the Communist Party
elites in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia in particular. Serb nationalists, led by Slobodan Milogevid, took
control of Serbia, Montenegro, and Serbia's two autonomous provinces. Nationalists in Slovenia and
Croatia reacted by demanding political confederation and then moving towards independence, which
was declared for both states in 1991. Slovenia became independent after a short war, while in Croatia
the Yugoslav National Army, siding with Serb nationalists, occupied large, predominantly ethnically
Serb areas.
In Bosnia, nationalist parties representing the three main groups shared political power following
multi-party elections, but Croats and Muslims increasingly moved towards independence while Serbs
moved to create autonomous governments affiliated with Belgrade. Armed conflict broke out in April
1992. Serbs, backed by Belgrade, quickly occupied large areas of the country, and committed numerous
atrocities and war crimes in the process. Muslims and Croats began fighting in 1993, and Muslim areas
were reduced to a few small enclaves. Croats and Muslims committed atrocities as well, although in
smaller numbers than the militarily more successful Serbs. In all areas, however, the population became
increasingly homogenous, with members of other ethnic groups being driven out or leaving. Only some
of the larger Muslim cities retained any significant ethnic diversity.
There were various efforts at international diplomatic mediation during the war, especially by the
European Union and the United Nations, which imposed an arms embargo (that effectively maintained
the military advantage enjoyed by the Serbs) and created so-called "safe zones" around several besieged
Muslim communities. In 1994, the United States and NATO became increasingly involved, brokering an
agreement between the Muslims and the Croats and intervening militarily against the Serbs. In 1995, the
Serbs lost most of the territory they had held in Croatia and western Bosnia, while two Muslim "safe
zones" in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica and 2epa, fell to the Serbs. In November 1995, the three sides
negotiated a peace agreement under American auspices at Dayton, Ohio. Dayton Accords, supra note 4.
See generally WAYNE BERT, THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER: UNITED STATES' POLICY IN BOSNIA,
1991-95 (1997); ANTE (CUVALO, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1997);
ROBERT J. DONIA & JOHN V.A. FINE, BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: A TRADITION BETRAYED (1994);
ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (1996); NOEL MALCOLM,
BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996); DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE
WEST (1996); PETER F. SUGAR, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE UNDER OTrOMAN RULE, 1354-1804 (1977);
SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY (1995); THIS TIME WE KNEW: WESTERN RESPONSE TO
GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA (Thomas Cushman & Stjepan G. Mestrovic eds., 1996); WHY BOSNIA? WRITINGS
ON THE BALKAN WAR (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). See also SAMANTHA POWER, "A
PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 247-327 (2002); SAMANTHA POWER,
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War did not begin in Bosnia until early 1992, but the crisis there had
already advanced by late 1991, with the Sarajevo government moving towards
independence and Bosnian Serbs preparing to secede to remain affiliated with
Yugoslavia.53 The European Union extended recognition to Bosnia as a state
on April 6, 1992, as did the United States on the following day.54 What had
been isolated skirmishes quickly developed into full-scale warfare throughout
Bosnia with the open involvement of forces from the remainder of
Yugoslavia.
This process of recognition was not purely political, however. The
European Union made two crucial interventions that gave the process a quasi-
juridical and popular basis. First, in addition to issuing a set of guidelines on
recognizing new states,55 the European Community established the so-called
Badinter Arbitration Commission in late 1991 to deliberate on appropriate
responses to the crisis. 5 6 In January 1992, in its first opinion, the Commission
determined that Yugoslavia had ceased to operate as an effective state and was
in a process of dissolution.57 In subsequent opinions, the Commission also
found that the Serb population of Bosnia had broad minority rights, 58 but no
right to secession, and that the republican boundaries of the former
Yugoslavia had the status of international borders.
59
The European Union did not approve Bosnia's application for
recognition outright. When the Bosnian government requested recognition, the
Badinter Commission recommended that it hold a referendum on
independence, noting that "the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to
have been fully established." 60 When the referendum was held in late
BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS: A CHRONICLE OF EVENTS, JANUARY, 1989 TO MAY, 1993 (1993)
[hereinafter POWER, BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS]; TrNDEMANS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-68;
53. Bosnia declared sovereignty on October 15, 1991. POWER, BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS,
supra note 52, at 24. On October 25, 1991, Bosnian Serbs formed their own parliament. LAURA SILBER
& ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 216 (1996). On January 9, 1992, Bosnian Serb
leaders declared their autonomy within Bosnia; on January 11, their Krajina Serb Assembly declared
that the Bosnian Republic had ceased to exist, and later declared a Serb Republic on Bosnian territory.
POWER, BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS, supra note 52, at 24, 36.
54. POWER, BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS, supra note 52, at 37, 40.
55. Council of the European Community, Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, Dec. 17, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992)
[hereinafter EC Guidelines].
56. LALONDE, supra note 37, at 176-78. See also STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-
MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (2000); Maurizio Ragazzi, Introductory Note, 31
I.L.M. 1488, 1488-90 (outlining the formation, procedures, and work of the Commission).
57. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1488, 1494 (1992). See also Paul C. Szasz, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, 88 AM. SOC. INT'L
L. PROC. 33, 34-35 (1994).
58. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
1.L.M. 1488, 1497 (1992). See also Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old
Wine in New Bottles?, 3 TRANS. L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 57, 65 (1993) (observing that the opinion
"can be charitably described as unclear").
59. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 3, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1488, 1499 (1992).
60. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 4, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1488, 1501-03. The SRBH referred to the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until
1992. Independent wartime Bosnia was called the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Dayton
Accords changed its name simply to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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February 1992, over two-thirds of the voting-age population voted for
independence; however, the Serbian members of the population, (who
represent thirty-two percent of the total) boycotted the vote. In effect, the
referendum functioned as an ethnic census: almost all Muslims and Croats
supported independence, almost all Serbs opposed it.
62
The Badinter Commission grounded its decisions in part on domestic
Yugoslav law, especially the country's federal structure, and in part on
international legal principles. The Commission's interpretation of domestic
constitutional provisions (besides giving rise to a flurry of academic
speculation about the international legal consequences of federalism 63) was
controversial in the Yugoslav context. Domestic interpretations of the
provisions on self-determination in the 1974 Constitution had been heatedly
contested, 64 and there had been no clear consensus on a right of secession. 65 In
any event, there were two caveats to the relevance of the constitutional
structure-namely, the evident "disdain of laws and legality," 66 which marked
much of Tito's Yugoslavia, and the delegitimization and collapse of the
Yugoslav state. The latter was emphasized by the Commission's declaration
61. POWER, BREAKDOWN IN THE BALKANS, supra note 52, at 36.
62. Bosnian Muslim and Croat political groupings agreed on independence from Serb-
dominated Yugoslavia, but little else. Their mistrustful relationship devolved into war in 1993, with the
Croats forming Herceg-Bosna as a client of Croatia. At various points in the war, there was also intra-
group fighting, and some cross-ethnic cooperation.
63. See, e.g., Otto Kimminich, A "Federal" Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW
OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 23, at 83; Hannum, supra note 58, at 64-65, 69; Patrick
Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on
Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 23, at 101.
64. See Vojin Dimitrijevid, The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in
the Collapse of Yugoslavia, in YUGOSLAVIA, THE FORMER AND FUTURE, supra note 51, at 45 (discussing
varying interpretations of the Constitution). The 1974 Constitution mentions self-determination in the
following context:
The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-
determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed
in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War
and Socialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historic aspirations, aware that
further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interest, have,
together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free
and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working
people-the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
USTAV SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUHOSLAVIJE [Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia] (1974) art. 3. The Constitution also defined Yugoslavia as:
a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and
their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and
Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the
power of and self-management by the working class and all working people; it is at the
same time a socialist self-management democratic community of working people and
citizens and of nations and nationalities, having equal rights.
Id. art. 1.
65. Ben Bagwell, Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of
Member Republics, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489, 516 (1991) (noting that "[a]n explicit textual
provision outlining secession under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 is nonexistent").
66. Dimitrijevid, supra note 64. I do not mean to suggest that the Yugoslav constitutional
order was always without effect during the post-1974 period merely because it was sometimes
circumvented; certainly it was often respected and provided a protective legal framework. I wish only to
suggest, with Dimitrijevid, that subsequent analyses ought not simply assume the democratic legitimacy
of Yugoslavia's constitutional system, especially those parts, such as the republican borders, originating
in the early Titoist period.
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of Yugoslavia's dissolution. This brings into question the wisdom of relying
on a (failed) paper constitutional structure to make a determination with real
political consequences on the shape or capacities of its successors.
The international principles on which the Commission relied, including
the principle of uti possidetis (by which it found a right of succession in the
republics, but not the provinces or the nations), imported significant parts of
self-determination doctrine into a non-colonial context. Yet this seemingly
Wilsonian turn, not taken by the doctrine since Versailles, 67 was curiously
limited. The Commission's amalgam of domestic and international
borrowings vested this novel right only in existing territorial units-the
republics-rather than ethnic groups, as Wilson's self-determination would
have done. While under decolonization a self-determining people had an
immediate right to independence, in the Commission's view the pre-existing
state had to be in dissolution before its sub-units could exercise an
international right to statehood. Because this new right only operated if an
existing state was in dissolution, the Commission's rule inevitably vested this
right in units whose independence, powers, and shape were, for the most part,
already the object of violent contestation:68
It was a competition to create wholly new nation-states--citizens and loyalties, strategic
assets, and borders defined by the perceived right to national self-determination within
the territory of a former state. Defined by the economic and political conditions of the
collapse of a state and its ability to provide security and civil order, the contests were a
series of wars ... in which the projects of radical nationalists willing to use force to claim
territorial sovereignty and the spontaneous behaviors of people facing this collapse
interacted.
69
The intensity and locus of the dispute constituted a powerful objection to
relying on uti possidetis. In the past, uti possidetis had been employed in an
atmosphere of comity to achieve minor border corrections, with the aim of
preventing conflict. To be sure, the various post-colonial states involved had
disputes between them-otherwise there would have been no need to invoke
the principle-but they were in general prepared to accept the application of
uti possidetis to prevent conflict, instability, and uncertainty. These were truly
"border" disputes. In the Bosnian context, at the beginning of the war, it was
difficult to characterize the parties' relations in the same mode. There was no
67. The Commission was of the view that the International Court of Justice had earlier
suggested the universal application of uti possidetis, see Frontier Dispute, supra note 37, at 565, albeit
still in a colonial context. See also LALONDE, supra note 37, at 190-93; Rein Muillerson, Law and
Politics in Succession of States: International Law on Succession of States, in DISSOLUTION,
CONTINUATION AND SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 5, 19-21 (Brigitte Stem ed., 1998).
68. Treating the referendum as a solution to the crisis has been described as "naive":
The constitutional logic of the Arbitration Commission set up by the EC under the
chairmanship of Robert Badinter seemed impeccable: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
republic, therefore a people in whose hands sovereignty rests; if the majority of the
people democratically endorses independence, then the conditions are met for accepting a
new state into the community of nations. As the outcome demonstrated, majoritarian
democracy in a setting of three ethnic groups ... does not provide a solution; it only
highlights the conflict.
See, e.g., TINDEMANS ET AL., supra note 1, at 34.
69. Woodward, supra note 52, at 222.
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comity, nor any sense that conflict or instability could be avoided by
invocation of uti possidetis, and-most fatal-the issue in Bosnia was not one
of border adjustment, but of the very existence (or not) of an integral state or
separate states. 70 The use of uti possidetis analysis in the Bosnian context,
therefore, mostly demonstrates the unprincipled operation of the doctrines-
but it was used, and a precedent was set.
Thus, we might debate the wisdom of the Badinter Commission's much
criticized decisions, 7' but the fact is that it made them, and they were largely
relied upon by the European Union and the United States. 72 It is a historical
fact that Yugoslavia did break apart. The European Union and the United
States took the position that the republics were the logical successors of the
dissolved state but that the citizens and nations themselves did not have any
such right. The fixity of this determination seems unshakable, unquestioned,
and unquestionable. The issue of Bosnia's continuation as a recognized state
is not viewed as a legally interesting question.
73
However, that determination remained a policy preference, rather than a
recognition of reality, so long as the military and political outcome was
contested. It did not follow that the republics actually invested themselves
with full state power over their territory. State control is not merely a function
of some abstract right or Commission finding. It is grounded in practical,
realizable, and realized capacities to act and to control. 74 Indeed, how else
could Yugoslavia itself have been found to dissolve, if not through its loss of
capacity to act and control?
70. See Ratner, supra note 23, at 596-98.
71. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 31, at 7; Szasz, supra note 57, at 35 ("Brief, cursory, and
not always convincingly reasoned, they deal with many complex issues of international law in a few
pages. Nevertheless, they constitute nearly all the judicial decisions we have on the subject of state
dissolution; therefore, one must pay attention to them.").
72. Szasz, supra note 57, at 35 ("Though not binding on the states and entities concerned...
these opinions have generally guided the [EC] Conference, as well as its successor [the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia], and even the world community at large .... "). In
acknowledging a quasi-juridical aspect to the recognition process for Bosnia and the other republics, I
do not mean to suggest that process was not principally defined by broader political interests. The
international community was motivated by a desire to avoid precedential effects for the Soviet Union
and other countries, to manage the spreading conflict, and later, once Slovenia's and Croatia's
independence had been effectively conceded, to characterize the conflict as international, rather than
internal, and thus give the international community's involvement a clearer legitimacy by overcoming
the doctrinal and political resistance to intervention in states' internal affairs. Indeed, it is reasonable to
see these as reasons for why the international community at first resisted but ultimately recognized what
was in effect a series of secessions. The point is that self-determination doctrine neither supported the
parties' decisions nor guided them; something else did, and that something was expressed in legal terms
that logically continue to define the parameters, and the possibilities, of debate today.
73. Consider this exchange:
Professor Ratner: I do not think ... that there is much of a legal question in the debate
over whether Bosnia should continue to exist as a state.
Professor Szasz: I certainly agree with the last part of the previous statement.
Szasz, supra note 2.
74. This has been clear at least since the Aland Islands dispute following World War I, when
the issue of the Finnish state's control over the Aland archipelago turned on questions about when
Finland had actually exercised authority over itself following Russia's disintegration and Finand's
declaration of independence. See HANNUM, supra note 23, at 371. See R.H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES:
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990) (describing recognized but
factually non-existent "quasi-states"); M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-1995, at 51-85 (1997) (discussing criteria for recognition).
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Yugoslavia did break apart, and something succeeded it. In some cases,
such as Slovenia, it was relatively easy for the group controlling the republic
to accede to state authority. For Bosnia, with several groups vying for state
power on different parts of its territory, it was much more difficult.7 Certainly
the actors involved thought it was less than clear that the republics were the
inheritors of state authority, even if they conceded that Yugoslav authority had
collapsed. Indeed, this was the very question being contested.
The Commission, the European Union, and the United States declared
Yugoslavia dissolved because it no longer performed the functions of a state,76
except on one portion of its territory, 7P and therefore ceased to warrant
recognition. Necessarily, this was also the rationale by which they judged and
presumably could still judge the republics. Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia's
putative successors, never did-and arguably never fully has-performed the
classic functions of a state except on one portion of its territory. The majority
of its territory continues to be governed in practice by separate parties with
their own institutions, economies, and armies. The end of Yugoslavia was "a
destruction in progress. 78 The creation of its successors was, and continues to
be, a very halting progress of its own.
79
There was, on the Badinter Commision's own reckoning, a gap of
several months between the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Bosnia's effective
75. Danilo Tulrk, Remarks Concerning the Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, 3 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 50, 54 (1993) ("In Bosnia-Herzegovina the situation was much more difficult
[than in Croatia or Slovenia] and every reader of newspapers knew that the government in Sarajevo did
not have effective control over the territory of the country.").
76. Under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, which includes a standard definition of
statehood, Bosnia probably did not have the traditional qualifications for statehood when it was
recognized-or at least, did not possess those qualifications any more than the other two principal
contestants. The Montevideo Convention provides that a state only exists when: (1) a government, (2)
with the capacity to enter into relations with other governments, (3) is in control of a permanent
population, and (4) living within a defined territory. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. See also
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 38-39 (1994);
William A. Schroeder, Nationalism, Boundaries, and the Bosnian War: Another Perspective, 19 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 155 (1994).
77. That is, on Serb-held territories, the interests of the federal government and the Serb
leadership were nearly identical by 1991-92. During the war, the Bosnian government controlled a
limited territory, and its interests, in practice, were identical to those of the Muslim area's leadership;
although the Bosnian state leadership now thoroughly incorporates all three groups, in the most critical
sense, that parallel persists.
78. Szasz, supra note 2, at 33.
79. One scholar argues as follows:
[T]he necessary condition for a state to exist is that it supplies security to its citizens ....
That was the approach taken by the so-called Badinter's commission set up by the
European Community to judge the viability of the respective ex-Yugoslav states looking
for international recognition. In that sense, former Yugoslavia was a state, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not.
VLADIMIR GLIGOROV, WHY Do COUNTRIES BREAK Up? THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA 101 (1994).
This judgment was certainly accurate during the war when Gligorov was writing. However, one
important difference in the post-war period is that in late Yugoslavia, state institutions were collapsing,
whereas in Dayton Bosnia, the state's extremely limited competences are being haltingly expanded and
are a function of its constitutional structure, rather than a constitutional collapse. (Thanks to Marcus Cox
for this point.) To the degree dissolution reflects lack of political or popular commitment to a state, this
difference is perhaps less important.
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succession (and recognition).80 Thus, it seems there was a period during
which, logically, there was no state at all. This period, like the war that
followed it, was a time of maximum contestation and positioning among the
parties, and this is exactly what we would expect dissolution to entail. 81 It
could have been, as well, an open period for the establishment of claims to
statehood. Relatively orderly procedures and principles could have been
established for recognizing those claims. The same strictures contained in the
European Union's recognition guidelines (issued for republics only) could
have been impressed upon any claimant. The result would hardly have been
any worse than what actually occurred.
82
Yet, the Badinter Commission left Yugoslavia's new dispensation "up to
the republics." 83 It not only limited succession to pre-existing categories of
questionable relevance, but in so doing it posited a rule that "it is sufficient for
a constituent republic ... to cease participating in the federal government in
order to deprive the state as a whole of recognition as a state by the
international community. 84 The rule seems transparently ineffectual in its
overreaching. If it were good law, it would give the Republika Srpska (or, for
that matter, South Carolina) an ability to opt out through simple non-
cooperation, something that the international community (and, some time ago,
the United States) has already made clear that it does not intend to allow. 85
Still, it is a rule, inescapable in the Commission's logicand implicit in states'
responses to the Yugoslav crisis: dissolution is measured by the real actions
and capacities of political entities; subsequent state formation is influenced by
the municipal political divisions that those failed states put in place. It is
important to realize that the Commission did not rely on any supposed right of
the republics to secede. Instead, it relied on the following three factors: the
fact of Yugoslavia's dissolution; the assertion of democratic legitimacy for
new state claims; and the position that existing borders were the relevant units
for measuring democratic intent. Bosnia never seceded: its people formed a
state out of Yugoslavia's dissolution and their own democratic will.86
80. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 11, 31 I.L.M. 1488
(1992).
81. See SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 161-64 (1998)
(defining state collapse and distinguishing it from secession).
82. Any period of claims would have encouraged maximum efforts to gain territory in
advance of the division. In the actual event, that is precisely what happened. Only a resolute refusal to
allow an ethnically oriented solution could have avoided such a land grab. It is doubtful that such an
approach would have been respected by the parties, and the land grab would have proceeded without
legal cover. In short, it is possible that the worst effects of such a plan would have been no worse than
what in fact occurred.
83. Hannum, supra note 58, at 64 ("[T]he Commission concluded 'that the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is engaged in a process of dissolution' and that it was up to the republics to
resolve any problems of state succession which might result from this process...
84. Hannum, supra note 58, at 64.
85. See Hannum, supra note 58, at 64-65 ("Such a rule would no doubt astonish the
government of the United States, Canada, Germany and other federal states, and it could lead to
immediate recognition of secessionist movements in federal states .... ).
86. When Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia achieved international recognition,
the situation was not described in the language of "secession." HANNUM, supra note 23, at 498 ("[T]he
term 'secession' was never used by the United Nations or individual states. Rather the international
community claimed to be simply responding to the fact of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and purported
2004]
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None of this militates against the existence or continued recognition of a
Bosnian stale, if that is our, or the Bosnians', preferred policy. But it does
bring some of the bases for that preference into question, and into tension with
concerns about precedent and consistency. It reveals, for example, that the
doctrinal structure might allow alternative policies and outcomes. Because
dissolution is a generic conclusion assessed on the facts, it occurs as often as
the facts warrant. And because recognition evidently may be extended even to
entities that only partly fulfill the criteria for statehood after dissolution of a
larger unit (as was the case for Bosnia), such a process of recognition might
be replicated within the resulting sub-units, even if they did not yet exercise
the functions of a state on all or part of their territories. This is the inescapable
logic of the Badinter Commission.
Still, recognizing the generative potential of dissolution does not tell us
what might or should happen in Bosnia. As we have seen, the international
legal doctrines do not favor claims by mere groups. Despite the ultimately
political nature of recognition, states have seldom recognized a group-based
claim. But the Badinter Commission's own findings and the international
community's own actions may have created new and surprising options based
on its triad of dissolution, democracy, and borders. Since we have just
considered what dissolution might mean, let us look more closely at how the
two affirmative elements needed to claim statehood--democracy and
borders-shape claims about Bosnia's future. How do they sound in the
traditional legal doctrines? How do they appear after war's end?
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CLASSICAL MODEL
Self-determination should logically focus on people. Yet, as we have
seen, except for the initial Wilsonian venture, it has been realized through pre-
existing territorial boundaries. Such a model hardly seems to hold much
promise for ethnic secessionists in Bosnia hoping to harvest the fruits of state
dissolution, given that, prior to the war, none of the three groups had a clearly
delineated exclusive territory of its own. A large portion of each ethnic
population lived in mixed areas or areas where it constituted a minority.
But the "existing borders" model for self-determination may not be such
barren ground for state reformation as it seems at first. Bosnia may prove to
be an extraordinarily potent test case for change in the doctrine. The effects of
the war and the American-brokered Dayton Accords have created the political
and legal basis for the three ethnic groups to press territorial arguments for the
right to self-determination, or its equivalent. Two events have occurred since
the outbreak of the war to change the picture: radical demographic shifts, and
the creation of new, internationally sanctioned boundaries.
A. Population Shifts
The war radically transformed the demographic map of Bosnia and
effectively separated three peoples into ethnically exclusive territories. While
to recognize the new states only after that dissolution had occurred.").
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some Croats and Muslims remain in or have returned to the Republika Srpska,
the territory as a whole is extremely homogeneous. The picture in the Croat
and Muslim areas, while more complicated, is in its essentials equally
dramatically altered when compared with the pre-war situation. 87 Refugee
returns in the eight years since the war-especially as they are probably
considerably fewer in number and have produced far less actual re-integration
than even the relatively small amount commonly supposed-have not
changed the hard fact of this new demographic dispensation.
87. Neither Muslims nor Croats have entirely contiguous territories: the Muslims have the
bulk of their land and population in central Bosnia, but also a pocket around Bihad in the northwest; the
Croats control the southwest, but also have numerous small pockets within Muslim-held central Bosnia.
All of these territories are well-defined and their populations are highly homogeneous. Some Croats and
Serbs continue to live in overwhelmingly Muslim Sarajevo and Tuzla; however, these much touted
multi-ethnic populations are more proverbial than substantial.
88. Undoubtedly, the degree to which people have returned to or reintegrated their
communities affects the potential significance of the wartime demographic shift: if few have returned,
separation is greater; if more have returned, separation is lesser, and consequently the effect in doctrine
should be less as well. So what is the true level of ethnic reintegration?
Statistics on refugee returns are readily available. See, e.g., Norwegian Refugee Council, Bosnia
and Herzegovina: 330,000 People Still Displaced Eight Years After the Peace Agreement, Jan. 30, 2004,
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/228f4e9c026lec43cl 256e2b0053d904?OpenDocument
(summarizing various sources on returns); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.unhcr.ba/return/index.htm. This information is,
however, not necessarily particularly probative. I know of no comprehensive study of refugee return, but
some tentative conclusions are possible: first, total cross-ethnic or "minority" returns are probably no
more than 435,347-a considerable number constituting some ten percent of the pre-war population.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Minority Returns 2004,
http://www.unhcr.ba/retum/T5-0104.pdf (last updated Jan. 31, 2004). "Minority" returns designate
returns to areas with a different local ethnic majority. Id. Second, this number includes "returnees" who
have in fact simply returned to sell property or have subsequently left again. The definition of "return"
that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) employed after the war considered
a refugee or displaced person a "returnee" if he stayed one night in his former home; no records are kept
on the duration of returns. One cause for the spike in returns in 2001-2002 was apparently a change in
rules governing the return of property, raising the distinct possibility that many of these "returnees" were
simply extracting the value of their property rather than permanently relocating. See, e.g., Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of State, U.N. Refugee Agency To Help Bosnia Set Up Asylum System (Feb. I1, 2004),
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/balkans/04021 l-bosnia-refugees.htm; BiH DPRE Union Press
Conference in Tuzla: False Returnees, Houses Reconstructed, May 20, 2003,
http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/tfeno/ FeatureStory.asp?Article= 60567 [hereinafter Bil DPRE Union
Press Conference] ("[T]he number of true returnees is alarmingly small .... Houses were rebuilt for
false returnees, who later sold or exchanged them, There are places with 80% of cases like those, like
Rogatica. This is why true returnees still live in shacks,"); Alic, Better Late Than Never, supra note 8
("During a 7-year period, local authorities have managed to process only 300 out of 11,000 appeals for
property restitution made by their ethnic Croat and Serb citizens .... [T]he number of actual returns was
10 times smaller because refugees have simply been afraid to reclaim their property, restitution or no.").
In addition, there are qualitative concerns with return statistics as a measure of re-integration:
many genuine returnees are in fact living in largely homogenous, isolated communities, often near the
inter-entity boundary line; they are in effect moving the former frontline, not reintegrating, and many
areas have seen almost no returns whatsoever. See, e.g.,BiH DPRE Union Press Conference, supra..
It is therefore speculative, but reasonable, to assume that the actual, meaningful number of cross-
ethnic returnees is considerably less than the UNHCR figure commonly reported. The number of re-
integrated returnees-that is, the number of people whom a separation would affect or whose presence
would militate against the creation of a new population balance-may actually be very small, and is
certainly much less than the UNHCR figure, although no one today knows how many there are. The rate
of return has apparently peaked: minority returns in January 2004 were at their lowest rate since March
1999, and on track for the year as a whole to be the lowest since the war ended. Id. This is not because
almost everyone has returned, as hundreds of thousands remain listed as refugees or internally displaced
persons; instead, it may be that almost everyone who wants to return has done so.
In any event, the overall lesson is the same. Even if returns were quantitatively and qualitatively
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Though the product of war and, in many instances, international crimes,
these new areas are in fact homogenous. As such, they are, at the least, far
better candidates for a Wilsonian exercise of self-determination-which
ideall devises borders to match ethnic groups 9 -than they were before the
war. 9 One of the principal objections to the self-determination of nations
(rather than of populations in defined territories) is the disruption that this
division causes in terms of partitions and population transfers. Given that the
harm has already occurred in this case, the map has shifted here in favor of
allowing a claim of secession. If allowed, the populations of these regions
couldeffectively and legally separate themselves from their fellow citizens
without causing significant additional harm,91 because for over ten years they
have already been separated in fact.
B. Recognition of New Internal Boundaries
Perhaps even more important than the homogenization of population
groups is the fact that their ethnicized territories received recognition and an
imprimatur from the international community through the peace process. The
nations became the possessors by proxy of defined territories with potential
significance in any future claim for state reformation.
as significant as the international community claims, Bosnia would still be radically less integrated than
it was before the war; it is, at the least, a relatively stronger Wilsonian case today. Bosnia is far more
homogenous now than it was in 1991 and returns have not changed that: there is no longer any ethnic
"crazy quilt." Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004)
supra note 9. A partition, whatever its cost then, would be much less costly today.
89. And ideally a Wilsonian self-determination devises borders around ethnic groups'
traditional homelands. Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 180. See also id. at 189-92 (arguing that claims of
recent provenance outside of a group's traditional or historical territory will be disfavored). Claims to
newly created ethnic territories indeed seem weaker; the shape and even location of the new territories
are as much the result of recent military exigency as any historical attachment to the land. For example,
Serbs seized a largely non-Serb corridor in northeastern Bosnia and expelled Muslims from areas of
eastern Bosnia that had never had an ethnically Serb majority to consolidate their territories. Into these
territories came Serb refugees from other parts of the country, who had themselves fled fighting and
persecution or had been expelled (similar accounts could be made for the two other groups and the
territories under their present control.). Their flight was surely unwilling, but that is not the question
facing anyone seeking to determine the state of things in Bosnia today. Instead, one must recognize that
the ethnic groups are now collected on territories not necessarily corresponding to their original or
historical ethnic claims, but representing the pragmatic locus of existing, ethnically defined state
institutions. As a matter of theory, Brilmayer's assessment is probably accurate, but as an analytical
question of doctrine embedded in politics, it perhaps overstates the controlling effect. It hardly matters if
the ethnic territory is the ancestral hearth or a recent acquisition-the real questions concern the
territory's severability, the secessionist group's present-day commitment to that territory, and its
relationship to other groups besides the secessionists.
90. Cf TINDEMANS ET AL., supra note 1, at 29 ("This non-correspondence of ethnic and
political boundaries is of course the continuing challenge to nation-state building in the Balkans. Hence
this is the classic situation of 'one territory for two dreams."'); id. at 188 ("Groups that are ethnically
distinct, but possess no independent territorial claims, have very poor chances of convincing anyone of
their right to secede."). The dreams and claims still exist, but now they are heard from a distance. The
territory is, for the first time in history, possessed by discrete groups.
91. Of course, previous expulsions and seizures of property can constitute continuing harm.
Note, however, that denial of the right to self-determination has not translated into actual
implementation of those Dayton provisions concerning the return of refugees and displaced persons to
their homes, so it is possible to suppose that recognition would not result in any additional or greater
harm. Further, secession would not preclude compensation or returns, and so would not necessarily
create any new or greater harm than the present dispensation.
Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives
A major component of the peace was the creation and recognition of a
series of international borders in Bosnia, along lines comporting with the
military, and thus the ethnic, division of the country. These plans, realized in
the Washington Accords 92-which ended the fighting between Croats and
Muslims-and in the 1995 Dayton Accords, confederalized and cantonized
Bosnia.93 The Washington Accords created a Federation between the Muslims
and Croats that divided their territories into ten cantons. The Dayton Accords
largely retained this structure, adding to it a separate and highly autonomous
Serb entity within a confederal Bosnia.
Together, these two agreements created a political structure with striking
analogies to the former Yugoslavia prior to its collapse. 94 The structural
similarities between Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia have often been noted,
but usually in the context of concerns about Bosnia's political viability. Less
commented upon is the opportunity those structural similarities create in law,
should the day come when Bosnia indeed finally fails-or when we wish,
finally, to admit that it has. Even accounting for all the progress towards
integration, Bosnia today is even more confederalized than the former
Yugoslavia ever was. Its internal units are even more independent, even more
homogenous, and even more alienated from the capital, than the republics and
provinces of Yugoslavia were.
Recall that the international recognition of the republics' claim to
succeed Yugoslavia was in significant part based on the internal boundaries of
the country. This was an application of the principle of uti possidetis95 in
keeping with the general rule governing self-determination. It might be, then,
that the fruits of the war and the Washington and Dayton Accords have placed
the Republika Srpska and the cantonalized Federation, and therefore the
ethnic groups for which they are proxies, in a position comparable to that of
the republics that inherited sovereignty from the former Yugoslavia.
92. Outline of a Preliminary Agreement on the Principles and Foundations for the
Establishment of a Confederation Between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation, in Washington,
Mar. 1, 1994 (text annexed to annexed to Letter Dated 3 March 1994 From the Permanent
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1994/255 (1994)); see also Proposed
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 33 I.L.M. 743 (1994); Dayton Agreement on
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995, 35 I.L.M. 172 (1995);
Paul Szasz, Introductory Note, 35 I.L.M. 75, 76-77 (1995) (discussing the various documents relating to
the creation of the Federation, and noting that the Agreement just cited was "the latest in a series of
instruments . . . designed to shore up the uneasy alliance between the parties that constitute the...
Federation.").
93. The President of the Republika Srpska, Mirko _arovi6, has been reported as having
described Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Bosnian state as a quid pro quo for recognition of the
Republika Srpska in the 1995 Dayton Agreement. "The interests of the Serbian people [were satisfied]
by the creation of a 'functional and decentralized state' consisting of the Republika Srpska and the
Croat-Muslim Federation. ... 'Looking back, we have nothing to be ashamed of. Our way was the right
way, and we would do it the same way if we had to again."' Patrick Moore, Republika Srpska Marks
10th Anniversary, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Jan. 9, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/01/090102.asp.
94. Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two 'entities'-the Republika Srpska and the
Federation. The Republika Srpska has a unitary political structure, while the Federation has ten cantons
as well as entity-level institutions. The Bosnian state has a small number of ministries, a parliament, and
a tripartite presidency, all of whose selection and operation ensure representation for the main ethnic
groups and for the entities. See Waters, supra note 8, at 531-32.
95. See supra note 37.
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Moreover, it may place them in a position comparable to that of many colonial
peoples inasmuch as they have a clearly defined territory and an ethnically
distinct one at that.
96
All that is missing from the analogy to the old Yugoslavia prior to its
collapse is the formal claim of a right to secede, problematic and contested as
that was. But the logic of state failure does not actually require that element,
which, if present, only provides guidance for identifying the successor. The
Badinter Commission's findings were not premised on a pre-existing
municipal right of the republics to secede, but instead on a fact of state
dissolution in a federal context. Any state can dissolve, not only those with
constitutional provisions for secession and self-determination. The Badinter
dissolution principle could apply to any state, and its determinants are
contingent, historical, contextual, and political. They do not rely on the
existing municipal legal framework. In addition, the Badinter Commission's
preference for the republics as the recipients of sovereignty was primarily
justified, not on a municipal right of secession, but on the international legal
principle of uti possidetis-i.e., on the existence of salient internal borders. As
a general principle of international law, uti possidetis can apply to any state's
internal or administrative boundaries, and no further municipal provisions are
required for the international community to invoke the principle once
dissolution has occurred.
C. Interpretative Objections: Domestic or International Claims
If the Dayton Accords expressly forbid secession, should that not close
the matter? Interpretations of the Dayton Accords differ dramatically. Quite
often, both the local groups and their international interlocutors have insisted
that they favor full implementation of the Accords, while disagreeing about
what that means. The document itself is ambiguous, probably purposefully so.
Certainly, the political field is still open, whatever the text may say.97 Still, it
96. This is especially true for the Republika Srpska. See PEGG, supra note 81, at 162 (noting
that the Republika Srpska could be considered an example of a de facto state forming out of state
collapse). The case for Croat or Muslim secession on uti possidetis grounds is more complicated.
Ethnicity was explicitly a factor in the creation of the Federation's internal borders and joint institutions,
which scrupulously respect a rule of dual ethnic representation. However, the fit between ethnicity and
boundaries is not perfect and, indeed, was made with the idea in mind that at least some of the cantons
should be multi-ethnic, given the number of small Croat pockets spread throughout generally Muslim
central Bosnia. Therefore, dividing the Federation along its cantonal boundaries would only imperfectly
correspond to ethnic control of territory, although most of the cantons are ethnically homogeneous.
97. The open-ended nature of Dayton's ultimate consequences has been described as follows:
The Dayton agreement stopped four and a half years of terrible conflict, but it did not
foreclose either of the ultimate options for Bosnia and Herzegovina: reintegration or
partition. The eventual outcome still might be the creation of a unified Bosnia-
Herzegovina, or the opposite-a final splitting-up of Bosnia into two or three parts; or it
might be an uneasy, indefinite survival of a nominally unified Bosnia.
TINDEMANS ET AL., supra note 1, at 55. Indeed, the nervousness with which the United States and the
European Union contemplate any territorial or constitutional change elsewhere in the region (e.g., the
secession of Montenegro, the independence of Kosovo, or the conflict in Macedonia) for fear of the
effect in Bosnia-while at the same time insisting that Bosnia undertake reforms (e.g., to its economic
and military structures) that themselves require revision of the Dayton Accords-suggests the parties'
belief in the integrity of Bosnia as a single state in its current form is far from a given.
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is reasonable to suppose that Dayton was premised on a "no-secession"
bargain.
98
Yet, even if we concede that the Accords rule out secession, why should
this bind the parties or our analysis? If a right to state formation is found in
international law, it trumps a contrary limitation in Bosnia's constitution or
the Dayton Accords. After all, the anti-colonial doctrines of self-
determination, including the claims of uti possidetis, were not domestic
constitutional law in any colony. In recognizing the Yugoslav republics'
independence, the Badinter Commission relied on principles of international
law that trump domestic law, and, in so doing, constitute a model for how it
might be done again. When considering an international legal claim, the
domestic legal dispensation is a question of fact. Whatever the reservations, it
seems incontrovertible that the Washington and Dayton Accords have made
the international legal framework relatively more conducive to a claim of
secession, or rather, to recognition that the war, by its killing, its horrors, and
its dispossessions, had already made it so.
D. Moral Objections to Rewarding Aggression and Genocide
A more powerful objection to secession is that the territorial changes in
Bosnia resulted from aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, and that allowing secession now would be contrary to the principle
that such acts shall not be rewarded. For example, the crimes committed by
Serbs9 9 might vitiate their present claim to territory conquered during the
war. 100 Rejecting the Serbian claim, and similar claims, seems intuitively
persuasive and morally salutary. On closer inspection, however, it does not
seem to bear up or to provide much guidance about the future.
Moral judgment clearly has a role not only in politics, but in the
doctrines: it is implicit in requirements that a state maintain a representative
government and in the doctrine ex iniuria ius non oritur (from a wrong, no
right can be derived) I l-and it forcefully affects the legal assessment when a
community's rights are altered because its society is considered irredeemably
98. Thanks to Dana Susan Burde for this point. See also infra note 93.
99. Similar objections could be raised on a far more limited scale against Croats and Muslims.
100. See THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 7 (describing the Republika Srpska as the international
community's "great failure in the region. It has been a compound failure, starting with the refusal to
prevent, then confront Serb belligerence (199 1-93); continuing through the presentation of increasingly
pro-Serb peace plans (1993-95), followed by the legalisation of the [Republika Srpska] itself, an entity
founded on acts of genocide .... ).
101. See Council of the European Community, Declaration on Yugoslavia, Dec. 16, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 1485-86 (1992); EC Guidelines, supra note 55 ("The Community and its Member States will not
recognize entities which are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of
recognition on neighboring states."); Szasz, supra note 57, at 35 ("[A] separate 'Declaration on
Yugoslavia' incorporated by reference the entire general Declaration [on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union] and imposed further behavioral
rules for these states, including the requirement that the successor republics adopt constitutional and
political guarantees that they: (1) asserted no claims to neighboring states ... and (3) would conduct no
hostile propaganda against neighbors."). Of course, many groups-such as insurgent predecessors in
Algeria and Israel-have successfully prosecuted state-formative claims despite waging campaigns
involving terrorism.
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evil. 102 Moral judgment would surely weigh heavily in the international
community's assessment of a Serb secession, for example, given the
numerous and well-documented atrocities committed in the course of creating
the Republika Srpska. It was the same, one might suppose, in 1992, when the
international community recognized one claimant to statehood on the territory
of Bosnia, but not others.
But, that is not exactly how things happened then. International
recognition of Bosnia occurred prior to, or just after, the outbreak of
hostilities. It is impossible for the United States and the European Union to
have based that recognition on atrocities that had not yet occurred nor were
even known to be contemplated; 10 3 Srebrenica is simply not relevant to the
recognition granted in 1992. We must search elsewhere for the rationales for
that initial decision, and we must still ask what reasons motivated, and what
effects arose from, that original decision, as well as later actions. As we have
seen, the Badinter Commission decisions that governed the process and that
favored the claim of the republican government to statehood exhibit a logic
about the role of borders that may play out very differently after Dayton,
without reference to the effects of crimes and injustice.
There is scant support in literature or practice for the position that
peoples otherwise having a claim to self-determination lose that claim simply
because of the method by which they seek to exercise it. 104 Even in the ashes
of the Second World War, it was assumed there would be, as there is, a
German state. t0 5 Though it may seem morally unpalatable, it is analytically
supportable that even committing genocide does not extinguish an
independent claim to self-determination or succession to a dissolved state.
102. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT
SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 56, 61 (1991) (defining Nazism as a culture and noting that "some
cultures may be so pernicious as to warrant no protection at all .... Indeed, some cultures are so
heinous that they may be and should be destroyed.").
103. See Hannum, supra note 58, at 68 n.43 ("The war crimes and crimes against humanity
reportedly committed at least by Serbian and Croatian forces cannot be cited in an ex post facto manner
to justify the earlier secessions.").
104. M.J. PETERSON, supra note 74, at 81-85 (noting a lack of support for limits on recognition
of states founded through violence). Only the most extreme instances might warrant such a conclusion.
BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 56, 61. Buchanan's argument speaks to culture, rather than political
formations, in a way that further limits its reach. I have heard no argument, for example, that Serb or
Croat culture ought to be destroyed because of acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing committed by
organized groups of Serbs or Croats against Bosnian Muslims. Political reconstruction usually focuses
on ruling elites and ideologies, not on the broader people and its claims: de-Nazification in Germany and
de-Baathification in Iraq target leadership groups, but assume state continuity (and in Iraq's case,
territorial integrity). Buchanan's argument seems apposite only in ultimate cases such as Nazism, and
even then only because of the aggressive and threatening nature of those cultures or regimes. It would be
difficult to find support in Buchanan or elsewhere for the proposition that a society whose
perniciousness had not reached the level at which it was deserving of destruction would not still retain
whatever claims to self-determination it might have had.
105. Certainly there was discussion of the alternative: the permanent pacification,
demilitarization, and de-industrialization of Germany, as well as its dismemberment. See KOZTES-
EUR6PA 1763-1993 [EUROPE-BETWEEN 1763-1993] 502-03 (Lajos Pdndi ed., 1995). But these views did
not prevail except to the degree of creating two German states-later unified-and effecting massive
transfers of industrial infrastructure to the Soviet Union. There are no discernible international legal
constraints on the sovereign states of Germany or Austria today owing to their conduct in the Holocaust.
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Moreover, even if a group's actions were immoral and illegal in a way
that altered or abrogated a prior claim, the objection is still not dispositive. It
does not necessarily follow that an immoral or illegal act never has legally
cognizable results or that situations created by that act are always void in
every respect, the doctrine of ex inuria ius non oritur notwithstanding.'0 6 Even
if a situation is fully voided by the illegal nature of its creation, the
continuation of that situation through time may create a habitualized
acceptance, culminating ultimately in other members of the international
community recognizing the validity of the situation. If the Serb entity were to
maintain its separate nature and its ethnic exclusivity for a sufficiently long
period, the argument that it would have the right to determine its own future
would be strengthened in inverse proportion to the weakening of the direct
claims of exiled Muslims and Croats.
One need not wait on time; intervening acts may legitimate the effects of
an otherwise illegal or immoral event. One need look no further than the
Bosnian peace process itself: the United States' public commitment not to
reward aggression was formalized and de-problematized by Dayton's "51-49"
rubric, whereby Serbs retained less than half of Bosnia's territory in exchange
for recognition of a separate Republika Srpska, which had not even existed
before the war. 07 Arbitrary and unprincipled as it may have been, recognition
of Republika Srpska and the cantonalized Federation satisfied the
determination of the international community not to recognize the fruits of
aggression. Yet any gain-any change in the political and legal
dispensation-conceded in the wake of aggression surely recognizes and
rewards that aggression. After all, just months before Dayton was negotiated,
Srebrenica was still home to tens of thousands of Muslims; today it is a rather
desolate town in eastern Republika Srpska, and one can find the signatures of
President Bill Clinton and Alija Izetbegovi6 on the agreement that put it
there. 108 The war and the Dayton Accords created a new border that did not
match any already on the map, though it tracked the front line and with it the
map of ethnic predominance. Those many places where the map of the
beginning and the map of the end were different-Srebrenica, Bijeljina,
Prijedor, Viegrad-mark caesurae in our humanity. Eight years' effort has
not significantly reversed that separation, nor filled the empty places Dayton
inscribed in law.
106. See Mfllerson, supra note 67, at 21. The examples of conquests that have entrenched
themselves in the international order and given rise, in their turn, to new claims are too numerous to
require citation.
107. The Republika Srpska is a signatory to several of the Dayton annexes and documents, and
it authorized Milotevi6 to negotiate on its behalf at Dayton. See, e.g., Letter to President Slobodan
Milogevid, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from the Delegation of the
Republika Srpska (Nov. 20, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 153 (1995) (asking Yugoslavia to act as
guarantor "that the Republika Srpska shall fulfill all the obligations it [under]took"). It must therefore
have some meaningful international legal personality.
108. Dayton Accords, supra note 4. Izetbegovi6 was the recognized President of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war and at the Dayton negotiations; Clinton signed for the United
States as a witness to the Accords, as did representatives of the European Union, France, Germany,
Great Britain, and Russia. Id.
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The Dayton Accords thus gave legitimating sanction to an admittedly
immoral and illegal state of affairs. The voluntary accession of the principal
claimants for an integral Bosnia to Dayton's territorial configuration arguably
overcomes any previous objection based upon the method of acquisition.
Such acquiescence in turn creates a new dispensation relevant to future calls
for change. The dynamics of state dissolution and reformation necessarily
refer to the status quo that preceded them, not only to some fictive preference.
This suggests that a rhetorical stance opposing aggression is analytically,
politically, and legally separable from concrete proposals for a settlement, or
for changes in that settlement. "[A]t some point, the principle of ex iniuriajus
non oritur gives way to the principle of ex factus jus oritur."110 Indeed,
following the international community's own logic, it might be that, since a
secessionist Republika Srpska would remove less than half of Bosnia's
territory, recognition of that entity would not reward the original act of
aggression either. Whether that would be a salutary policy is a different
matter, one of preference, but the point is that it would be at least equally
consistent with our prior legal and moral commitments.
These seem like narrow, technical rebuttals to a moral objection, but
they are broader and deeper than that. They are really about the importance of
time in law. Once this becomes clear, it is more possible to think about the
antecedents to our policy choices as the contingent preferences they are, rather
than as ahistorical legal necessities. Much of the moral thinking about the
Balkans takes place in a kind of time warp, in which it is still 1991, and the
United States and Europe are still considering what is to be done to prevent
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. With wholly admirable goals of encouraging
multiculturalism and co-existence, that discourse starts from the premise that
Bosnia must be preserved, and therefore any secession or partition is a
definitional evil."' It seems clear enough, however, that the choice of year,
whether it be 1991, 1995, or 2004, affects the salience of that premise. After
1995, and still in 2004, there is no unified Bosnia to be preserved. It exists
more by virtue of its international recognition than in fact. Arguments for
multiculturalism or against rewarding aggression must therefore start from the
premise that Bosnia would have to be created, not preserved. It is still
possible to make a moral commitment to that project, and perhaps it is a
worthy enough goal to warrant the disruption, but it is necessary to take those
costs fully into account. This implies changing a status quo in which effective
control of the territory has already been divided among three groups and
109. This argument might come at a heavy price for secessionists, however. Relying on the
Dayton Accords implicates its other provisions and effects, and invites an interpretation of that
agreement by the international community, which is far more likely to read into it a bar to secession. But
as a doctrinal question, all that matters is that, as of 1995, their territorial claim has been vindicated;
subsequent events, including a potential future dissolution of Bosnia are therefore interpreted and
constructed upon that agreed base.
110. Richard C. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate Through Legal Restorationism:
Citizenship Rights in Estonia, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315, 328 (1997).
111. See, e.g., Szasz, supra note 2, at 47-48 ("The objection against further fragmentation [of
Croatia or Bosnia] ... is basically a preservationist approach-a wish to maintain what still exists.
Yugoslavia is gone, but Croatia and Bosnia may still be salvageable. There is no particular logic in that
position.").
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mediated by the international community's military, political, and economic
interventions. That surely implies recognizing, first, that the status quo has
already changed, and asking what that might mean for one's commitments.
We turn to that now, before considering an additional, more compelling,
rebuttal to the moral objection.
V. STATUS Quo NOVO: PEACE AND STABILITY AS ARGUMENTS FOR
RECOGNIZING SECESSION
Was not the attempt at maintaining the status quo of borders, first at the level of
Yugoslavia, then at the level of its republics, a contribution to war?' 1
2
Discussing the role of historical grievances in secessionist claims, Lea
Brilmayer notes that:
(e]ven if an historically sound evaluation is possible, this will not end the inquiry. A key
remaining issue is the extent to which the status quo should be altered to rectify past
wrongs. This could be called the problem of "adverse possession." Few would say that
the status quo deserves no weight at all. Even a separatist is likely to concede (albeit
reluctantly) that the status quo is sometimes important11 3
In Bosnia at war's end, separation was effectively completed, if unrecognized.
That truth has changed little in the intervening years. Despite the re-
integration that has admittedly occurred, who today could doubt that it would
be easier-if not necessarily preferable-to create three separate states than to
integrate fully Bosnia's fractious elements? In the context of Bosnia's politics
today, Brilmayer's status quo argument sounds like a defense of the existing
separation. Today, arguments for restoring an integral Bosnia have become
Brilmayer's "historical grievance"-a recent one, to be sure, but a grievance
against the new status quo nonetheless. Arguments against secession are
reversed by a status quo novo of effective separation. The question then
112. Laponce, supra note 33, at 37.
113. Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 199. There is no canonical consensus on how to interpret
group-based claims for the reformation of state borders outside the colonial context. See, e.g., ROBERT
MCCORQUODALE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xi (2000); Simpson, supra note 13,
at 255-58 ("The vocabularies and strategies of classical colonial self-determination are no longer
adequate tools with which to confront 'the tumult of ethnicity' that has propelled us into the post-Cold
War era.") (citing DANIEL P. MONYIHAN, PENDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 15
(1994)). I rely on Lea Brilmayer, a respected scholar in the field, not so much for a novel argument, but
as an important and creative synthesis of elements and interpretative perspectives already present in the
debate. Brilmayer explicitly frames her test as a way to see past a false choice to the underlying
constituent elements of group, claim, and territory. Brilmayer's reliance on the interpretative or
decisional importance of the status quo finds foundation in other scholars, such as Buchanan.
BUCHANAN, supra note 102. Indeed, many views of self-determination share Brilmayer's elements in
some way. So the particular choice of interpretative framework would not, I think, greatly alter the
thrust of the argument in that all tests inevitably weigh one group's claim to a particular piece of
territory against another's; this is, in fact, Brilmayer's point. Readers are welcome to consider the
argument I make here about status quo effects in light of any other scholar's approach to border
reformation claims.
There is an additional, though not unique, advantage, of my chosen approach. Brilmayer is
writing in 1991, just before the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars, and consequently, her synthesis of the
law on self-determination reflects the range of doctrinal views in which international actors themselves
were operating at that time. I do not presume to know her view of my argument; the modification and
extension of her views into the postwar environment is my own.
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becomes: do those desiring an integral state have a strong enough claim to
justify disrupting the present de facto order, whether by reconquest1 14 or, more
to our point, by claiming diplomatic, economic, and military support from
outside powers?
A. Arguments Concerning Restoration of the Status Quo Ante
One of the principal rationales for resisting self-determination claims is
the need to maintain peace and stability. Stability is also related to moral
concerns because we place moral value on stability as a prerequisite for a just
and prosperous society. If two parties, namely the would-be secessionist group
and dominant group, have otherwise equally valid claims to territory, or if the
secessionist group's claim is not overwhelming, the secessionists ought not
risk armed conflict detrimental to the good of all. The strong version of this
argument says the potential harm from conflict is so great that it trumps
almost any group's interest in seceding.'
1 15
This argument is compelling, but once secession has occurred it is
equally compelling as an argument against revanchism. The potential harm
from renewed conflict, regardless of purpose, outweighs the ongoing injustice
and harm incurred by a completed de facto secession. At a minimum, the
burden would be on the revanchist party, just as it would normally be on the
seceding one, to justify its insistence on restoring the status quo ante.
For example, economic disruption and harm to the remaining or majority
population's economy is often cited as an objection to secession. 1 6 Yet, eight
years after the peace agreement, Bosnia's various economies are still only
minimally integrated. Separation would not provoke economic disruption, and
indeed, re-integration would arguably be more disruptive. Although there is
now considerable economic activity between the various ethnic sectors, there
is still probably more economic interaction between, for example, Herceg-
Bosna and Croatia than between Herceg-Bosna and the Muslim sector or the
Republika Srpska. Likewise, Republika Srpska retains close ties to Serbia's
economy. Indeed, the level of cross-ethnic integration is almost surely less
than cross-border integration with other units of the former Yugoslavia. 17
114. The Dayton Accords prohibit the entrance of armed forces of either of Bosnia's entities
onto the other's territory. Recent constitutional changes promoting greater integration of the various
armed forces do not remove the effective veto of each ethnic group on the use of military force. In this
light, it is interesting to consider that "[m]aintaining territorial integrity may no longer remain as the best
means of maintaining world stability." Demissie, supra note 41, at 192.
115. The exception when the dominant group has already embarked upon a campaign of
destruction against that group is essentially an argument for survival, in which secession is a mere
means. See BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 64-67 (noting that the threat must be a lethal one).
116. See id. at 92-93 (economic self-defense); Whelan, supra note 25, at 109 (noting
Sudetenland's importance to the viability of the Czech state).
117. Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004),
supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004),
supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12, 2004),
supra note 10; Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12-13,
2004), supra note 9 (noting the activity of Croatian and Slovenian companies in Bosnia). See also
Jelacic & Katana, supra note 11 (noting the relatively small amount of inter-entity traffic).
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Similarly, moral concerns argue for allowing displaced persons to return
to their homes. However, if reasserting integral Bosnian authority over all
areas of the country would threaten the well-being of other more numerous
refugee groups and original inhabitants--or would create greater instability, as
seems plausible-then under Brilmayer's test, it is difficult to imagine the
moral or legal justification for such action. In any event, the burden would be
on the revanchists to prove that return, however morally preferable, would not
run afoul of concerns about upsetting the status quo with all its harmful side
effects. 1 18
Here, as elsewhere, the damage has already been done. The relevant
question is whether the new situation-in which, despite eight years of
international effort, the units are still more separate than they are integrated-
should be undone.1 9 Under Brilmayer's test, the burden of demonstrating that
it should be undone lies on those favoring the change, not on those favoring
the continuation of the status quo.
1 20
B. Factors in Determining the Status Quo Novo
If this argument holds in principle, the remaining issues are evidentiary
and procedural. If we isolate out the effects of recognition, the very act at
issue, 12 we are left with a question: what is required for a stable status quo
novo? What conditions, and how much time? As an experiment, let us first see
how the elements of Brilmayer's secession test play out after separation, and
then, keeping in mind the definition of a state, 22 consider some minor
modifications of that test suitable to judging post-separation claims for
recognition.
1. Applying a Secession Test to Revanchist Claims
Brilmayer identifies the following factors in evaluating competing
secessionists' claims to territory:
a) immediacy of the group's historical grievance; b) the extent to which the group has
kept its claims alive; c) whether members of the state's dominant group resettled on the
118. Consider the legal and political situation of Palestinian refugees from 1948 or German and
Polish expellees after the Second World War.
119. Eight years after the war, it is unclear how much of the harm to the entities' economies
has been due to wartime disruption, sanctions, and postwar corruption, and how much to disruption of
Inatural' economic spheres. A sufficiently liberal trade system, however, could probably capture almost
all of the benefits of natural economic spaces while still allowing political separation. Croatia and
Slovenia have extensive and increasing business dealings with other parts of the former Yugoslavia,
despite having rejected all political integration with them.
120. Of course, further separation is itself a change to the extant status quo, and requires its own
justification. Yet if I am right that re-integration would be more disruptive than further separation, then
Brilmayer's test would still place the greater burden on the more radically disruptive proposal.
121. The effect of granting or withholding recognition logically cannot itself be part of the
evidence in favor of or opposed to a doctrinal finding about whether or not recognition should be
granted. Yet while analytically distinct, it is politically inescapable that the states' determinations about
what the status quo is are effected by what they think it should be, and are made in the course of
deciding about what group to recognize.
122. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 76.
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territory; and d) the nature of the historical grievance related to the territorial claim. 123
By applying this test but substituting "revanchism" (or "re-integration") for
"secession," we may test how claims to revise a de facto secession sound.
The immediacy of the historical grievance. Claims on behalf of an
integral Bosnian state are of recent vintage, at most twelve years. This means
that revanchists' grievance is immediate. But, the grievance is also novel,
since the state itself only came into recognized existence twelve years ago.124
The extent to which the revanchist group has kept the claim alive. This is
probably the weakest element in the Brilmayer test, since maintaining a claim
is not necessarily the same as having a good claim. Yet, revanchists favoring
an integral state have kept their claims alive throughout these twelve years,
defeating any easy claim of adverse possession by secessionists.' 
25
The extent to which the territory has now been settled by members of the
dominant group. Following massive, systematic expulsions, voluntary flight,
and resettlement of refugees from other areas, political-military control and
ethnic distribution now track almost perfectly in Bosnia. In that factual
context, consider the following from Brilmayer:
From the point of view of separatists, such new settlement ought to have no significance
whatsoever. They did not ask for these new inhabitants. Had the secessionists' territory
not been improperly annexed, the newcomers could have been excluded entirely. Taking
the newcomers' presence into account compounds the original injury. Yet, as a practical
matter, the new settlers tend to legitimize the territorial status quo.'
26
Merely replacing the term "separatist" or "secessionist" with "revanchist," or
accepting the thesis that a new status quo has obtained, produces a
123. Demissie, supra note 41, at 173-74 (relying on Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 199-200).
Compare another list of relevant factors drawn from a discussion of the effects of intrusive settlement by
a dominant group:
A settler infusion policy can significantly affect a number of the criteria by which the
international community will judge the legitimacy of a people's struggle for external self-
determination. These criteria include: the historical legitimacy and territorial integrity of
the geographical area claimed by a people; the degree to which the demanding group can
form a viable political entity; the consequences of self-determination upon the non-group
members in the territory; and the effects upon the region as a whole.
Eric Kolodner, Population Transfer: The Effects of Settler lnfusion Policies on a Host Population's
Right to Self-Determination, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 159, 198 (1994). If the secessionists-who
include large numbers of refugees-are thought of as effectively "settlers" under Kolodner's terms, then
again we see that those calling for an integral country are in fact the ones who must make a case,
because it is they who wish to change the status quo.
124. Imagine how we might apply this criterion to a claim by Serbs who boycotted the vote in
1992, or those living elsewhere in Yugoslavia, that the Bosnian secession itself was illegal-a claim of
the exact same age and immediacy. Indeed, at no point has Bosnia been a peaceful, stable, and integral
country. It has been contested since its founding.
125. But note the unsatisfactory nature of the adverse possession analogy in the absence of a
sovereign to vindicate the claim. In a world of sovereign states, arguably the passage of time and the
solidification of the new status quo could extinguish the right even in the face of consistent complaint by
non-state actors. The Sudeten Germans are a case in point. No party accepts that they have a right to
return, except as individual immigrants, or that they have a right to the return of their property. See also
BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 88 (arguing that there must be a moral and temporal "statute of
limitations" on claims to secession).
126. Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 200.
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surprisingly strong statement in defense of the successful separatist who has
resettled his own people in a given territory:
From the point of view of [revanchists], such new settlement ought to have no
significance whatsoever. They did not ask for these new inhabitants. Had the
[revanchists'] territory not been improperly annexed, the newcomers could have been
excluded entirely. Taking the newcomers' presence into account compounds the original
inju 7 . Yet, as a practical matter, the new settlers tend to legitimize the territorial status
quo.
Note how little change is required, and how the conclusion requires no change
at all. Brilmayer's logic is compelling, equally so to resist secession or, as in
Bosnia, to resist revanchism.
28
The nature of the historical grievance. The particular facts of an
historical claim may well affect parties' moral, political, and legal judgments
about that claim, and even about the legitimacy of a secession. Here, the test
may favor revanchists' claims because of the secessionists' record of forcible
expulsions and horrible crimes. As we have seen, political and moral
disapproval plays an unquestionable role in legal judgment. But, as we have
also seen, the evident power of moral objections or moral insistence on
reversing an already effectuated claim does not clearly guide one to a given
settlement or dispensation, especially if that moral sense mostly arises from a
past time and subsequent actions have altered conditions or even given an
imprimatur to an originally admittedly immoral situation. Simply put, the
legal force of the historical grievance may have been diminished at Dayton.
One particular feature of the Bosnian situation implicates all four aspects
of this historical grievance test: the presence of (presumably) pro-integration
minorities in the territories subject to potential secessionist claims and
revanchist counterclaims. Because they were themselves victims of the
conflict, these minorities directly represent the moral nature, the immediacy
and salience of the revanchist claim; because they are almost all refugee
returnees, they materially affect the demographic dispensation as well. Do
these vitiate or constrain the argument for a largely completed secession?
129
Four points arise.
127. Id. (with words in brackets replaced).
128. Cf Kolodner, supra note 123, at 202 (arguing that settlers who have lived in a territory for
some period gain rights, including the right not to be deported). Of course, some "revanchism" has
already occurred, in the form of international support for refugee resettlement across ethnic lines.
Nothing in this argument suggests that revanchist settlers are not equally capable of creating a new
status quo. Even if refugee returns have been relatively small, see supra note 88, they may have
occurred in numbers sufficient to make the costs of separation too high.
129. In 1995, separation of the populations was almost total, but persistent international pressure
has produced some returns, and separation would represent a harm to them. Indeed, the International
Crisis Group has argued:
The partial nationalist victory in October [2002] prompted some commentators to suggest
the time had come for the international community to give up on its multinational
experiment in Bil and accept a final partition. The will of hundreds of thousands of
refugees and displaced persons to return has already rendered such a division nearly
impossible, barring more war and ethnic cleansing .... Bosnian returnees have rejected
the nationalist programs, encapsulated in the wartime refrain that "we cannot live with
these people anymore", by returning to their pre-war homes. The viability of the Bosnian
state and the stability of the region depend in large measure upon whether they can stay
and prosper.
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First, there is no reason to assume that non-integration or separation
would necessarily lead to the persecution of minorities. Technically,
separation would be of a territory and its population, not an ethnic group, and
the international community could perfectly well maintain an interest in
minorities' welfare, including a right to intervene to prevent abuses of their
rights. Indeed, one of the central insights of this argument is that the increased
security separation afforded to the majority might allow a relaxation of
policies towards remaining minorities. It is reasonable to suppose that many in
the Republika Srpska, for example, would accept the existing refugee
populations, and even accept more returns or border adjustments that would
reassign many returnee settlements to the Federation, as the price of
international support for secession. Right now, the majority has almost no
positive incentives to accept returns, and the results of eight years of efforts
against majority interests, however morally justified, reflect that. But even if
this is correct, it would be unduly optimistic to suppose that many minorities
would wait around to test the proposition; given the actual events surrounding
the creation of these ethnic-majority territories, we should assume any
minority community compelled to separate would likely depart.
Yet second, as noted earlier, the actual numbers of meaningful returns
may actually be quite small, and many of those returned communities could
probably be accommodated in places through minor, mediated border
adjustments (some large returnee groups of Muslims in Prijedor, for example,
live in homogenous communities quite close to the confrontation line). This
was the model Dayton itself imposed, despite its strong commitment to
refugee returns, by requiring the transfer of districts around Sarajevo, a
decision which led to the departure of some 60,000 people after the war had
ended.130
Third, even if we concede that separation would encourage some or
most minorities to leave, we must recognize that the present policy is also
implicated in continuing population shifts. The uncertainty and instability that
enforced integrative policies create are probably factors in the continuing
departure of some individuals. Of course, poor economic prospects probably
motivate the majority of departures. This, however, is also partly a function of
the present dispensation, because the destabilizing integrative project
discourages investment. 131One need not equate these demographic effects
with the proximate effects on minorities that recognizing separation now
would have, but neither ought one simply pretend that the costs are entirely on
one side. It may be that, in the long term, the present policy will lead to more
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 7. If this is right, it would represent a powerful objection to the
observation that the population has been decisively altered.
130. See, e.g., Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 88.
131. No census has been conducted, so no one knows for certain, but many observers suggest,
for example, that the population of the Croat areas is collapsing as Croats move abroad, often to Zagreb
or the coast; Croats may now represent only eleven percent of the population, down from seventeen
percent before the war. Interviews with two anonymous OHR officials, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz.
(Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz.
(Mar. 12, 2004), supra note 10. The main reason these people are leaving is economic, but there is an
ethnic underlay: Croats have somewhere to go, and Muslims do not, so they stay. Is this a victory for
integration?
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depopulation than would a stable separation.
Finally, we must ask difficult, even uncomfortable questions about the
model in which we currently operate, and its precedential effects. If a majority
of a defined territory's population desires separation, and a small minority
with a legitimate concern for its security rejects it, what is our doctrinal and
political response? Does the historical memory of ethnic cleansing
permanently disable a territorial or majoritarian claim? Does non-violent harm
to the political interests of a minority necessarily preclude a majority's
exercise of a claim to separation? In 1992, when Bosnia seceded, it did not.
2. Modifications for a Generalized Status Quo Test
Much of Brilmayer's test can be usefully adopted wholesale for
considering revanchist claims, that is, objections to acknowledging Bosnia's
non-integration. Applying the test, the results are mixed. Because Brilmayer's
test is directed at claims by groups that have not yet attempted secession, it
focuses less on their factual success in creating functioning state structures
than on the moral quality of the claim. 32 Thus, we might usefully augment the
test by explicitly considering the actual existence and functioning of the
separatist entity. As a first approximation, this analysis might address the
stability of the military separation, the existence of a civil and legitimated
state structure, and the effects of time and intervening action.
Military stability. The military outcome should not still be at issue.
There should either be peace or a clear stalemate, not merely a temporary
truce. Even though many observers have considered Dayton a "trucial way-
station,"'' 33 the evidence favors a new military status quo. Peace has held for
eight years, and the risk of combat in the near or middle term is very low.
Moreover, Dayton secured the continued separate identity of unintegrated
military forces, leaving multiple armies for a single country. The recent
creation of a joint defense ministry does not really alter this situation, even in
law, as it ensures a veto by each of the communities over the use of the armed
force. As the experience of the supposedly joint institutions of the Federation
armed forces shows, there is little reason to expect real integration of forces,
instead of a paper ministry.134 Indeed, the general opinion is that the situation
is sufficiently militarily stable such that war would not break out were the
international peacekeeping forces to further reduce their presence, as they plan
to do.
132. For example, Brilmayer does not give weight to factors like prospects for economic
viability.
133. WATERS, supra note 8, at 518. See also ( UVALO, supra note 52, at 48 (1997) ("None of
the three sides is happy with the idea of a multiethnic state and each side considers the Dayton treaty as
a temporary solution.").
134. Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004),
supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004),
supra note 9; Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12, 2004),
supra note 10; Interviews with anonymous OSCE official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12-13,
2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, in Sarajevo, Bosn.
& Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004).
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Still, this is not to say that the state would remain intact or that peace is
assured. Indeed, the most likely scenario for renewed violence would be if the
Muslim population decided to resist Serb and Croat moves to convert their
existing, effective separation into formal independence. 135 One important
change since the end of the war is that Muslim forces 1 36 are considerably
better equipped, and Serb forces considerably degraded. In the event of
renewed conflict, it is entirely possible that Muslim forces would decisively
defeat the Serbs and overrun much of the Republika Srpska in short order,
opening territories to resettlement by3 Muslim refugees and probably creating
large numbers of Serb refugees. Preventing such an outcome would
therefore require either a forcible intervention by NATO or the maintenance
of the present integrationist course. It is possible, in other words, that
continued intervention in support of integration, or even increased pressure for
integration, actually constitutes less of a risk of violence than separation.1
38
That would seem to be a strong argument for opposing separation.
That appearance is misleading, and misconstrues the doctrinal logic. A
campaign of military conquest would clearly overthrow the existing peaceful
status quo. It would be incumbent on the Muslim revanchists and their
international supporters to explain why such a move was justified. Merely
observing that one side is prepared to resort to violence to prevent the
peaceful exercise of a desire to complete separation is not sufficient to defeat
the claim that there is a status quo. Indeed, the need to resort to violence
suggests that there is one. Perhaps the answer is simply: the international
community ought not tolerate a violent shift in the status quo. Is that not
actually the rule now? Merely saying, "the Muslims would not tolerate
secession and would fight and perhaps win," does not necessarily decide the
matter: what should our response be? What was it when the Slovenes,
Croatians, and Bosnians sought to secede in 1991 and 1992, when violence
was used by a superior military force to prevent separation? Properly
considered, the increased strength of the Muslim forces complicates the
decision, but does not alter it: separation is largely completed, and could be
recognized. Only violent overthrow of the status quo could alter that.' 39
On balance, then, the military situation favors a finding that there is a
new status quo among three discrete, semi-independent armed entities. It
135. Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004),
supra note 9. Serb and Croat nationalists have relatively little incentive to take up arms again, having
secured most of their objectives except recognition.
136. Technically, of course, there is no separate Muslim force-the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina merged with the Croatian Defense Forces in 1994. Yet in practice, these forces
have retained a functionally separate structure. In the event of hostilities, they could and would fight as
separate forces.
137. Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004);
Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004).
138. By comparison, there is no question that at the war's end, in 1995, separation could have
been completed with far less violence or dislocation than integration would have entailed. To the degree
that this has become less true, the international intervention has had some effect in reintegrating the
territory by resettlement of refugees or by changing the military balance, or both.
139. Moreover, one should consider the total costs of dislocation. If Muslim revanchism would
create more non-Muslim refugees than it created opportunities for Muslim refugees to return, as seems
likely, would it be justified?
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definitely supports the proposition that the old status quo of an integrated,
multi-ethnic Bosnia (in Yugoslavia) has been definitively disrupted.
Effective and legitimated civil control. The new status quo requires that
some new civil entity have arisen on the contested territory-not merely
soldiers, but some new state-like body to replace the old, which has at least as
much legitimacy for those over whom it rules. It would be preferable, though
not necessary, that this control be democratically legitimate. The test is civil
legitimacy: could the new entity vindicate its control in an open political
contest or, more broadly, by means other than direct violence and repression?
This criterion is clearly satisfied in the Croat, Serb, and Muslim cases by
functioning institutions with most of the powers and accoutrements of
statehood except recognition. As we have seen, in the case of the Republika
Srpska, these institutions were even recognized by the international
community though the peace process. 140 All of these groupings, as of Dayton
in 1995 and to this day, probably have greater legitimacy (that is, internal
legitimacy, not necessarily international legitimacy, which is the very object
of our inquiry) than do state institutions.14 1
Passage of time. The amount of time required to alter the former status
quo is dependent on substantive events. It may be as short as is necessary to
establish effective control. While this runs counter to much thinking about
secession, 142 it rests on solid ground as a general proposition in international
law. Consider how this claim applies to conquest, as when the Allied Forces
defeated Nazi Germany; there was no lag period during which effective
sovereignty still vested in the Third Reich, even in regard to areas not yet
liberated when the capitulation was signed. 143 Arguments for the prevailing
right of Bosnia over secessionist claims are themselves based on a novel
dispensation that had no colorable claim before 1992, prior to which time
Bosnia was not a state. 144 Arguably, the amount of time required is a function
of the intemational community's moral evaluation of a claim, which is shorter
140. Herceg-Bosnian governing institutions have never been recognized under the Dayton
regime, although the repeated calls for them to stop functioning in the early postwar years suggested that
they had a certain reality. Nonetheless, over time their power has been much reduced and, though
informally still formidable, they in no way approximate the formal or real powers of the Republika
Srpska.
141. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 8, at 518; cf. Wood, supra note 8. Of course, the actual
authorities in control of those institutions may be corrupt or unpopular, see infra note 164, but this is
analytically separate from popular opinion about the institutions or existence of a (nascent) state.
142. For instance, Buchanan suggests that to defeat an interest based on a historic grievance,
"the interval would presumably have to be substantial. It would certainly have to be more than one
lifetime." BUCHANAN, supra note 102, at 89. See also Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 199 ("The further in
the past the historical wrong occurred, the more likely that it is better now to let things remain as they
are.,,).
143. "Supreme authority" vested in the Allied Control Council, acting on behalf of Germany,
which continued its state personality. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1997). In theory,
authority over areas still under Nazi control transferred with the surrender even before their actual
conquest.
144. The integral Bosnian claim could be constructed on a longer timeline deriving from veto
rights over border changes under the Yugoslav constitution, as well as the contested but ultimately
vindicated right to secede under that constitution. What is less clear is that an independent and integral
Bosnia's right vis-A-vis its Serb and Croat populations can be derived from the pre-independence period,
especially since those groups had an equally colorable claim of veto over any assertion of sovereignty.
As noted, claims deriving from domestic Yugoslav law are of questionable application in any event.
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for decidedly moral claims and longer for immoral ones. This probably
weakens the case for secession, though the standard moral objections probably
have been vitiated by our own intervening actions.
One objection to this "effective and legitimate civilian-military control
over time" model is the fact that even long-established insurgencies holding
land and exercising civil functions are not often recognized.1 45 Yet, states do
ultimately make legally relevant accommodations to the fact of power.146 A
blanket rejection of secession is not the operative principle. Most likely, there
is no principle, 147 only a calculation of interest in the case at hand. This
describes the Yugoslav dissolution itself, in which the United States and the
European Union first opposed republican secessions, then recognized them,
and now defend those republics against sub-secessions. So, we speak here
about a speculative yet plausible scenario in which powers support or
acquiesce in changes to a regime that they were instrumental in creating-a
far more fluid vision of the legal limits of our political options than present
policy contemplates.
Because Brilmayer's test is unfavorable to easy claims of secession, it is
also surprisingly unfavorable to the revanchist claims of Bosnian
integrationists. Incorporating the "effective control over time" modifications
proposed here probably makes a revanchist claim even less compelling,
regardless of one's own preferences. Indeed, whatever the test, the new status
quo in Bosnia shifts analysis significantly in favor of acknowledging the
obvious: since 1991, there has not been an integrated state on Bosnia's
territory. Dayton did not reverse, but rather cemented, that dispensation, and
subsequent developments have not fundamentally changed matters. There is
still barely a Bosnian state, and still not enough of one to matter. A U.N. seat
does not make a state, and most decidedly not a nation. Yet in the case of
Bosnia, that is about all there is: recognition has meant little more, except, of
course, the denial of everything else that is happening or could happen.
Let us revisit the historic logic of dissolution and recognition with an
eye to the international community's role in confirming and creating a
sovereign Bosnia and thereby denying the secessions that have already
occurred. That logic contains the seeds of the strongest argument in favor of a
realizable right to secession today, or at least to secession's fruit--democracy.
145. See HANNUM, supra note 23, at 498 (referring to "the continued rejection of secessionist
movements in other regions, even where such movements control substantial amounts of territory," as
demonstrated by, for example, the lack of foreign recognition for Tamils in Sri Lanka or rebels in
Southern Sudan). The prospects for recognition of claims in southern Sudan have recently improved.
146. Foreign recognition has been forthcoming for some groups that have been secessionist in
all but name: Algeria, Bangladesh, and perhaps the Palestinian entity. Even Taiwan, which the United
States explicitly derecognized, is still de facto independent, to the point where the United States has
committed naval forces to dissuade China from adopting a more assertive posture about its (admitted)
rights of sovereignty over the island.
147. Secession is of course not technically illegal under international law, but rather a
"political" matter.
Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives
VI. SELF-DETERMINATION REDUX: DISSOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY,
MORALITY AND DOCTRINE
A. Dizzy with Failure: The Moment of Recognition
Ten years on, external support for Bosnia's integration is still essential
and still insufficient, and Dayton Bosnia increasingly represents a real
obstacle to stabilization and prosperity. If one can identify any consistent
themes in Western law and policy towards Yugoslavia, they must reflect a
concern with stability 148 and, in a minor key, with justice. A principled
continuation of that policy would ensure a stable base for the region's
prosperity. How will that be achieved? It may be that stabilization would be
more easily achieved by state reformation. This is, after all, an empirical, and
not a moral question, although it would represent a pragmatic retreat from the
West's preferential commitments to the state of Bosnia.
The premises upon which the United States and the European Union
based their recognition decisions were not the only possible ones. Even if we
concede that the premises were correct, it still follows that in analogous
situations, the same logic should apply. What answer then would that logic
yield? The doctrines remain as rigidly opposed to secession as ever, 5° but the
experience of the Yugoslav Wars has provided the world with an
interpretative tool-a finding of dissolution-to relax that rigidity.
Recognizing new formations on Yugoslavia's territory did not necessarily
mean recognizing a right to secession. Dissolution moots a state's defenses
against secession, allowing new state formation even where secession or self-
determination does not doctrinally apply. 151
Thus, our policies on recognition were not and are not bound by a priori
rules, but instead are proxies for preferences that in turn give those policies
solidity. In Bosnia, recognition went a long way toward making a state and
clarifying the process of sorting out which claimant to support in more
148. See JOHN WILLIAMS, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE RISE AND FALL
OF YUGOSLAVIA 158-66 (1998); Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan./Feb. 2004, at 159 (arguing that "the chief threats to us and to world order come today from weak,
collapsed, or failed states").
149. See Jelacic & Katana, supra note 11 (quoting International Crisis Group analyst Senad
Slatina as saying, "No one in the international community is even considering [secession] as a
possibility. Too much money and time were invested in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and international
organisations, ranging from NATO through the European Union to the OSCE, are too involved here to
allow any changes to the existing state borders.").
150. The Helsinki Act has been described as having similar problems of rigidity to the Dayton
Accords:
The Helsinki Act, which was an instrument for peace when it was signed, became a
dysfunctional ideology with monumental perverse effects when it led, as it did in the
Yugoslav crisis, to an unwillingness to put pressure on the states with 'bad' borders to
make them good; when it led, on the contrary, as in the Dayton Accords, to the command
'Do not change borders; make do with what you have.' That is not always bad advice....
But the advice is an invitation to disaster if one makes it a universal rule, good for all
types of antagonisms .... What was required in the days of the cold war no longer makes
sense.
Laponce, supra note 33, at 36-37.
151. See PEGG, supra note 81 (distinguishing between secession and state failure).
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material ways. The decision in law mattered tremendously, even if it was
defined almost wholly in politics. Given outsiders' weakening resolve to
invest anything beside rhetoric in the costly project of creating Bosnia, the
theoretical alternatives are perhaps much closer than the rhetoric makes them
appear. Recognition of the existence of other new states on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia-that is, on the territory of the former Dayton Bosnia-
could likewise be attributed to the fruits of failure and dissolution which
would likely follow the withdrawal of our support and recognition.
In 1990, Bosnia's nations had no claim to separate political existence.
The war and the peace have made their claims stronger by identifying
territorial proxies whose claims are cognizable. Together with the war, the
choices the international community made in recognizing Yugoslavia's
dissolution, the Bosnian republic's statehood, and Dayton Bosnia's borders
have brought the territorial dispensation, the shape of the rules, and the
borders of the nations into an alignment that only awaits the moment of
acknowledgement. The question is, how do we know when to say Bosnia is a
failure? How do we know when we may, and should, withdraw our
recognition?
B. Democracy at the Dissolution, Democracy at the Creation
It is the preferred rule in international law that recognition does not
constitute a state but merely acknowledges (and perhaps approves) its
objective existence; at least, recognition does not alone constitute a state in the
absence of objective factors.' 52 This means perforce that the validity of a
secession, whether from an inchoate state or a failing one, is also a question of
fact to which recognition adds only expressive patina. In the case of stillborn
Bosnia, what of a state was there, save recognition? What differentiated the
parties at the outset, politically and legally? Apart from the preference for
republican borders, there was, perhaps, only the referendum.
Whatever the real reasons for our choice about whom to recognize and
our insistence on a republican solution, the core instrument of interpretation
for that choice was the referendum as an expression of the people's will.
Criticism of the recommendation that Bosnia hold a referendum has been
widespread. 153 Once it was apparent that the entire Serb population had
rejected independence, the Europeans and Americans were presented with a
choice, in a sense, between a Wilsonian moment and a territorial one. It was
not a choice that delayed them very long:
152. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention, supra note 76; PETERSON, supra note 74; SHAW, supra
note 143, at 296-98, 317; Hannum, supra note 58, at 63-64 ("The [Badinter] Commission ... noted that,
under principles of public international law, the existence or disappearance of a state is a question of fact
and... recognition by other states is purely declaratory.").
153. Szasz has described the referendum as "a disastrous initiative, because no such device was
provided for in Bosnia-Herzegovina's Constitution":
When the vote was held, the Serbs boycotted it; and when independence was thereupon
proclaimed the Serb could say: "You have violated the Constitution, and we are bailing out."
This claim became the main justification for the Serbian separation and subsequent actions in
Bosnia ....
Szasz, supra note 57, at 36. Note, however, that the Serbs had already taken steps towards separation.
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The question ... arises whether such a referendum should be considered a legitimate or
sufficient basis for granting recognition of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
European Community and the United States had to make one of the following two
choices. They could have said, "Since Serbs did not participate in [the] referendum, the
decision arrived at by the referendum is not legitimate." Following that course would
give Serbs in Bosnia a kind of veto power, which would be very problematic. After all,
since Serbs in Bosnia represent something like thirty-two percent of the total population,
that group should not have a veto on such matters as the independence of Bosnia. Instead,
the European Community and the United States said, "This was a democratic decision
supported by the majority and therefore we shall recognize the situation resulting from
the decision."'
154
War, as we know, broke out immediately, though that might have happened
anyway. The legitimacy of the decision-both the Badinter Commission's
interpretative turn and the international community's extension of recognition
consequent upon it-was correct under a strict understanding of democratic
majoritarian process, though hardly unproblematic. Accepting the result only
made sense if the territory of Bosnia was taken as a given-the conundrum
classically supposed to be a defect of Wilsonianism, but here a consequence
of the preference for a territorial system of self-determination--or if Bosnia
itself were seen as a moral and political necessity. If a Wilsonian rubric had
been applied, the outcome, though uncertain, would have been different. The
same, perhaps, is even more obviously true today.
But, the territorial-democratic rubric was applied, as the existing
doctrinal structure and the emerging right of internal self-determination would
have suggested. Bosnia was a legally significant territory-the population of
its territory constituted a people-and so that people's will, we said,
determined the matter. What is that will today? If a majoritarian democratic
logic proved decisive then, it could and perhaps should now, too. The only
question would be: what question should we pose?
Some might suppose that Bosnians today have rejected extreme
nationalist fantasies and want to live together in a peaceful, prosperous,
integral state.155 No doubt everyone wants to live in peace and prosperity, but
the shape and nature of the state they want or expect is a different matter.
What do the people in Bosnia themselves want? I certainly do not know, but
neither does the international community, since its core policy of supporting
and integrating the Bosnian state has never been put to a popular test. The
indicators we do have tend to suggest that project is not supported. As we
have seen, media reports and polling data show very weak support for the
state. 156 In various elections, Bosnians keep voting for nationalist parties that
are directly descended from those advocating independence for territories
encompassing their own groups and currently defend continued autonomy
154. Turk,supra note 75, at 55.
155. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 8 (noting the claims of international officials that "they
regularly test public reaction to their policies with opinion polls"). A survey in Mostar, where the 01R
has recently imposed a single municipal structure, indicated that "72 percent of the respondents
supported 'a unified city."' Id. The local-as opposed to state-patriotism of Bosnians is proverbial;
during the war, many fought for Sarajevo more than for Bosnia. Interview with anonymous OSCE
official, in Republika Srpska, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 11, 2004).
156. See supra notes 11 and 20-22.
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within the country-and under the Dayton regime, a politician cannot openly
call for independence. 157 It may well be that, empirically, a majority could be
found in support of division. Imagine a simple experiment: what if Bosnia's
next election asked for a vote on continuing with a single state or dissolving
into separate states along the 1995 ceasefire lines to be guaranteed by the
same international force already in the country? What would be the result?
Can anyone say with any confidence that the Bosnian people would choose a
unitary Bosnia?
Almost any conceivable anti-integrative scenario 158 might reasonably
yield a majority for state reformation. If a territorially defined referendum (for
that is what the 1992 Bosnian referendum was relative to Yugoslavia) were
held today in the Republika Srpska or Croat cantons, it is entirely plausible
that a majority, perhaps a clear majority, would vote for independence-even
if it were to include all absent refugee voters. Most Serb or Croat' 59 voters
probably would favor secession or union with their neighboring co-
nationals. 160 If the whole population of Bosnia were asked the question posed
157. To be sure, none of the political parties call for secession, but the international
community's intervention and its refusal to countenance public opposition make it difficult to gauge the
real political commitments of local actors. Acquiescence in reform may not signal anything but tactical
withdrawal. Interview with anonymous ORR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004),
supra note 9 (noting that local politicians will not tell international officials their actual opinions on
integration). One observer has noted:
The Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action, SDA; Croat Democratic
Union, HDZ, and the Serb Democratic Party, SDS, have moderated their attitudes
somewhat-at least publicly .... The SDS and HDZ in particular have learned not to
openly confront the international community, choosing instead to accept the terms of any
western deal in public-and then blocking its implementation on the ground. The OHR
and other international organisations are in the process of moving customs, taxes, defense
and some other key institutions from entity to state level. Only a couple of years ago, the
mere mention of such initiative could have triggered widespread demonstrations and even
violence, especially among Bosnian Serb and Croat hard liners.
Janez Kovac, Bosnia's British Bulldozer, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Nov. 18, 2002,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200211_383 2_eng.txt.
158. There is no single anti-integrative solution. Possibilities include separation of only the
Republika Srpska, union of the Croat and Serb areas with their respective kin states, creation of a third
Croat entity, a division of the Federation by cantons, and so on. I certainly am not advocating for any, or
any particular, solution, but am only observing that any plausible scenario for Bosnians' future will
likely correspond, in some meaningful way, to the existing ethnic divisions of the country. Even strongly
pro-integrative proposals concede that. See, e.g., EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, MAKING
FEDERALISM WORK-A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR PRACTICAL REFORM (2004),
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esidocumentid_48.pdf (proposing conversion of the Republika Srpska into
a canton). In speculating on levels of support for various solutions, I am most emphatically not
purporting to put words or policies into the mouths of Bosnians. But they believe something, and my
argument suggests that discerning what that is, without interference, is what matters and what should be
the aim of our policy.
159. To the degree that there might be a split in the Croat vote, it would likely be between more
hardline, nationalist Croats in Herzegovina and the more conciliatory Croats living in the pockets in
Muslim territory. See Patrick Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?, supra note 5. This geographically
delineated split-which also dovetails with the separation of the Croat communities within cantonal
boundaries-could actually make it easier to identify discrete majorities for secession in Herzegovina.
Although the joint secession of all Croat areas is one scenario, it is not the only one, and nothing
requires the totality of an ethnic group's population to adopt a single territorial solution. This is
especially true if they are already separated into defined territorial units that may decide separately.
160. Nerma Jelacic, Bosnian Croats Turn to Far-Right, BALKAN CRISIS REP., Nov. 20, 2003,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archivelbcr3/bcr3200311469-3_eng.txt ("An opinion poll conducted..
• by the marketing agency Promedia showed that 98 per cent of more than 5,000 Bosnian Croats
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above, almost all Serbs and Croats, and some Muslims-a small portion of
whom probably favor a nationalist, Muslim-dominated state over co-
existence 16-might vote for dissolution. The vote in favor might even be
higher than it was for secession from Yugoslavia in 1992. If the intervening
variable of continued Western commitment to integration were removed, and
the direct, punitive disincentives for local politicians to speak openly about
opposition to integration were lifted, these possibilities might become even
more likely.'1 62 Certainly the very act of asking these questions would make an
questioned said they wanted to abolish the border with Croatia."). Other opinion polls revealed
interesting information, as well:
Recent polls in Republika Srpska, RS, show that eight years after the end of the brutal
war that divided the country into two entities, the Serbs still do not want to live in a union
with the Federation's Bosniaks and Croats .... I would not like to live in Bosnia
without entities," Slavenka Ducanovic, a 28-year-old shopkeeper from Banja Luka [said],
"I think we [the RS] should join Serbia as our lives would definitely improve then."...
More than 50 per cent of the population in RS share her opinion according to a public
opinion survey conducted by the Banja Luka-based Partner agency in July [2003] .... I
think if Kosovo is taken away from Serbia, something should be given it in return," said
Sanja Vujicic, a 33-year-old hairdresser in Banja Luka. "Serbs are majority citizens in RS
so it would only be logical for us to be united with Serbia. I don't think the two entities of
Bosnia should be integrated under any circumstances because that definitely wouldn't
work." Darko Kurtovic, 32, a driver, differs only in so far as he believes RS should
become independent in the event of Kosovo being allowed to [secede] .... I certainly
do not think unifying with the Federation would work. We would only see the repeat of
what happened between 1992 and 1995." Sasa Borjanovic, a 23-year-old electrician,
[said] that unification was unthinkable, "I would be disgusted if it happened. If anyone
else in this town tells the truth they would say the same thing."
Jelacic & Katana, supra note 11.
161. Probably only very marginal numbers of Muslims affirmatively favor an Islamic state,
and only marginally more favor an ethnically Muslim-dominated (smaller) state over a multi-ethnic
Bosnia, assuming the latter could be successfully recreated. See Woodard, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting
International Crisis Group analyst Senad Slatina as saying, "Bosnian Muslims are so European that the
radical form of Islam has absolutely no chance of spreading [in Bosnia]"); Interview with anonymous
OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous
OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with anonymous
OSCE official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12, 2004), supra note 10; Interviews with anonymous
OSCE official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12-13, 2004), supra note 9; Interview with
anonymous OSCE official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12, 2004), supra note 9;However, this
does not necessarily preclude Muslims' voting for separation: few Muslims have a commitment to an
Islamic state, but neither do many have a strong affirmative commitment to a multi-cultural Bosnia
either. Furthermore, many might well adopt a "good riddance" attitude, akin to the views of many
English Canadians. And, in any event, one does not need a majority of Muslims to make a majority in
Bosnia. Indeed, if the Serbs and Croats voted as a bloc for separation-an entirely plausible scenario-
not a single Muslim vote would be required for a majority. Any Muslims voting for separation, however
few, would only increase the size of the majority.
162. In fact, the population may be more committed to nationalist and separatist solutions than
the political parties, whose platforms and actions are directly restrained by the international presence:
Many of the estimated 350,000 Croats living in Bosnia-the biggest proportion of the
Croatian diaspora-still dream of their regions of the country being annexed to Croatia
and are increasingly unhappy with the HDZ [the Croatian Democratic Community, the
dominant wartime Croat party], which once shared their goal, but has followed a less
nationalist agenda in recent months .... Even now, Bosnian Croats feel they were forced
into the Federation and still entertain thoughts of establishing a separate entity or a union
with Croatia. In Mostar, a local Croat, who gave his name only as Petar, spoke for many
when he said, "The question of Croats in Bosnia will not be resolved until we secede. It's
either secession or extermination."
Jelacic, supra note 160.
One of the principal justifications proffered by the international community for its intervention
is that local political actors are corrupt and unaccountable. See, e.g., Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at
69. They undoubtedly are (and not only the nationalists), but the prospect that more accountable parties
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anti-integrative majority more likely, given the tendency of electoral cycles, to
encourage more, rather than less, conciliatory positions on matter of
symbolism and identity.' 
63
One can quibble about details, margins, and timing, but the point is
clear: no one could deny that meaningful majorities for the dissolution of the
present state might well be found in almost any combination imaginable. No
one could say with confidence that Bosnia could clearly, easily withstand such
scrutiny by its own people, the way so many states in Europe could.
All this is speculative, but so is continued insistence that Bosnians favor
a Bosnian state. The evidence we have suggests that there may not be any
meaningful, affirmative majority for an integral state and that there may in
fact be larger and stronger constituencies for alternatives. This is all the more
plausible if one disaggregates the relevant population by region or by
ethnicity, rather than assuming the total Bosnian population as the only
relevant one.
Perhaps the main point is that there is evidence to debate, and that this is
an empirical question, not a moral assertion. Anyone who argues that
Bosnians themselves want integration, or that Bosnians are capable of
rational, self-interested democratic choice, should be prepared to accept and
support the opposite if it turns out that Bosnians do not. 164 Our present
policies will not allow that question onto the ballot or into the debate. Why
not? In 1992, the international community actually insisted upon an explicit
measure of the people's will on this ultimate question, however flawed that
decision may have been. Now, with all parties conceding that the present
structure is defective and with calls for constitutional reform multiplying, one
of the most obvious possible structural solutions is absolutely off the table.
might be even more nationalistic radically undercuts the rationale for continuing, non-democratic
intervention. But see Alic, supra note 21 (noting surveys and phone call-in shows suggesting support for
the OHR's efforts).
163. One frequent objection to a more open democratic process is that bad economic
conditions make voters more susceptible to radical or nationalist political appeals, including calls to
resist further political integration-and therefore it is premature to allow a fully open democratic debate.
Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9;
Interview with anonymous OHR official, in Banja Luka, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 13, 2004), supra note 9;
Interview with anonymous OSCE official, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 12, 2004), supra note 10.
This is probably accurate, but only begs the question of whether such political choices by voters are
illegitimate. The economy is bad, has been bad, and will be bad for as far into the future as anyone dares
speculate. What is the rational, correct, or legitimate response to that, and what is our justification for
ignoring or overriding it?
164. Braithwaite considers whether reform can succeed with nationalist governments:
But can reform succeed with nationalist governments? The non-nationalists say no.
Perhaps they are right-they have seen what they are capable of. But the war ended seven
years ago. And yet the nationalist parties are still the largest in the country. To say that
they have not changed and can never change suggests there is not much hope for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. [High Representative Paddy] Ashdown prefers to be an optimist. To
believe that a majority of its citizens can be convinced to support the state and Europe.
And to believe that the nationalist parties will accept reform, because that is what their
constituencies want. To believe otherwise would be to give up on Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and on the millions who yearn for a normal life.
Braithwaite, supra note 11. Note the conflation of "a normal life for millions" with Bosnia-
Herzegovina-a possible connection, but not a necessary one, nor one that is actually argued as much as
assumed.
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What is the legal or moral rationale for outside powers to insist that such a
question is out of bounds?
Decisions about what territory to use as the electoral baseline
predetermine electoral outcomes. One must therefore ask serious, substantive
questions about what is the most appropriate territorial baseline, and why.
Does continuing to insist on Bosnia make sense? If Bosnia today is a
functioning democracy, 165 what can justify limiting the choices that
democracy may make about itself? If Bosnians today wish to maintain their
present state, there is no justification for imposing a separation on them, and
nothing in my argument intends to advocate that. But, if Bosnians today were
to wish to discuss dissolution, what possible objection could outside powers
raise to their doing so? There is no good, no principled argument for insisting
on the perpetuation of a single, integral Bosnian state if that state's own freely
elected representatives and its peoples do not wish it. No proposal for a
constitutional convention, constitutional dialogue or reform of Dayton should
a priori exclude this possibility; indeed, no legitimate proposal could.
Some observers suggest that despite being a democracy, Bosnia is still
too fragile to survive an open, unrestrained debate. I agree, but could imagine
an alternative conclusion: perhaps Bosnia is fragile because its people do not
support it. After eight years of relative military stability, is this a state of
emergency or the status quo? 16 6 Unquestionably, even democratic societies
occasionally need to suspend democratic processes to ensure peace and
stability, and we have a legitimate interest in restricting election platforms
calling for violence or inherent evils. 167 Yet it stretches credulity to suggest
165. See, e.g., Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 72 (noting that the 2002 elections were deemed
"free and fair" and that [in] October 2002, Bosnia's democratic institutions were deemed mature enough
for the country to be received into the Continent's oldest club of democracies, the Council of Europe").
166. As analysts have noted:
The conditions that obtained in 1996 and the conditions that obtain today are separated by
a gulf too wide to be bridged by the assertion that both represent a state of emergency
that only a decisive and unquestioned authority can handle. When the High
Representative today speaks of an "emergency," he refers not to hate[-]filled radio
broadcasts inciting violence against peacekeeping troops but rather to inefficient tax
collection, the excessive regulation of private business, corruption in the public utilities,
or technical drawbacks that make the court system less efficient than it otherwise might
be.
Knaus & Martin, supra note 6, at 69.
167. Traditionally societies have provided for such a process through concentration of power
during a defined state of emergency or martial law. See, e.g., id. at 70-71. I can think of no good theory
or practice that provides for a permanent or open-ended abrogation of an entire society's democratic
autonomy. It is necessary to suppose that Bosnia-despite all the supposed progress over eight years--is
still in a state of emergency to justify a continued restriction on its democratic sovereignty. Yet if Bosnia
is still in a state of emergency, what does that say about the success of the project, or about the
international community's legitimate right to consider alternatives to an evidently failed project? While
it might reasonably be objected that it has only been eight years, and that more time is needed to embed
a democratic culture and a commitment to this fragile state, accepting that objection immediately raises
the question: how long will be required? At what point would we have to admit that it has been too long,
that democracy too long delayed is democracy denied: eighteen years? Twenty-eight years? Even the
almost infinitely larger projects of subduing and democratizing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were
sufficiently completed by the mid-1950s-in less than a decade-to allow a restoration of sovereignty
greater than what has been achieved in Bosnia, where international civilian administrators still hold
ultimate authority over democratically elected officials. Military occupation continued, but that seems
rather a different matter related to an obviously greater international security threat than Bosnia poses or
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that preferring not to integrate Bosnia is per se evil, or to maintain that
preferring division would be tantamount to defending or advocating the means
used to carry out the war.
This objection really masks a complex, underlying, unacknowledged
theory of democratic rationality's limits-a belief that people in certain
political and economic conditions cannot decide their own interests. This is
true, to a point; proponents of this "fragile democracy" argument therefore
need to define that point, a temporal limit, to have any legitimacy.
Integrationists face a Hobbesian choice of their own devising: either Bosnia is
stable and democratic enough to choose dissolution if it wishes, or it is not, in
which case, it will eventually fail and could be dissolved by our fiat. Indeed,
even proponents of "reform within limits" face an argumentative bind: if the
original 1992 referendum was the right process, what can justify barring talk
of state reformation today? If it was wrong, it must be the case that there was
something wrong with equating a republic's borders with a "people." If it was
right to dismiss anti-integrationist objections then because of democratic
principles, why not allow pro-integrationist objections now? If it was wrong
then, it must be because ethnicity does, after all, matter. But, if ethnicity
matters, then Bosnia makes little sense.
C. No Justice Without Peace: Morality, Rigid Doctrines, and Other Options
Our thinking about state reformation remains strongly opposed to further
change in Bosnia or beyond. But this view, neither necessary nor persuasive,
actually conflicts with thinking about what an internal, democratic right to
self-determination means. These are the basic elements of this intuition and
argument: Bosnia barely exists; identifiable, coherent structures and polities
exist within it; the structure of Bosnia present today is strikingly analogous to
that of Yugoslavia when all agree it began to dissolve; doctrine restrains us-
Bosnia's peoples are not candidates for self-determination-but doctrine's
alternatives have shown us, in Yugoslavia's own collapse, a way, a precedent,
and a compelling rationale. Only the catalytic impetus of violent crisis is
missing. Must we wait on that to effect needed change in the absence of a
functioning state, if we have the means at hand? 168
Why is the international community committed to the maintenance and
flourishing of this state-more committed, as almost everyone concedes, than
ever posed. See SHAW, supra note 143, at 165. And still nobody imagines that the foreign military
presence in Bosnia can be withdrawn in the foreseeable future, if Bosnia is to survive.
168. It should be clear from the preceding discussion that I do not think a partition--even
assuming a majority desired it-would be likely to occur without any political violence whatsoever, and
I readily concede that the international community might have a legitimate interest in abrogating
Bosnians' democratic autonomy if the risk of general violence were too great. I only suggest: that post-
war political structures make partition, not easy, but easier or more possible from a doctrinal and
political perspective; that the level of risk is a speculative empirical question which the international
community's current policy does not seriously measure but rather assumes; and that in so doing it does
not seriously consider the costs to Bosnians' democratic autonomy of its policy, when a possible
alternative exists. It is reasonable to suppose that an internationally monitored and policed political
process of debating state reformation could be conducted with minimal violence or disruption; if that is
accurate, then it does not make sense to refuse to consider the possibility out of fear that any discussion
of separation will inexorably lead to violence.
Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives
the populace itself? A host of shibboleths are ranged against the idea that
Bosnia might be divided: division would risk renewed war; destabilize the
region; damage fragile economies; jeopardize refugees' returns; harm
democracy; and validate injustice. Most of the objections are grounded in
empirical estimates and can be debated. 169 It is possible partition might
actually achieve greater stability now, if only because the moments of greatest
risk have passed and the most dangerous tests failed long ago: Bosnia is
already divided, its economies dissolved and reformed, its tens of thousands
killed, and its millions removed; there is arguably more instability in trying to
force these peoples and these systems back into something together than in
ordering the dregs of dissolution. These are not preferences, but claims about
what would likely happen. Others may disagree, but even to have this debate
on empirical grounds would be a sea change in our thinking about possible
outcomes in Bosnia. A shibboleth cannot be challenged, whereas a policy
based on empirical claims can be, and if the base is found wanting, the policy
can be abandoned.
The structure of the state and the law that binds it together are both so
weak and tenuous that policymakers should ask fundamental questions,
unconstrained by the conventions and proprieties of comity that normally
accompany relations between states. States in dissolution and states so weakly
supported by their own populations, including Bosnia, do not require those
169. For example, an important question concerns the state that would be left behind: the
Muslim remainder. Would the Muslim sector be a viable state? In principle, a remainder state might be
unviable, and it is an open question how this might affect an otherwise valid claim by a territory or
group to secede. It is not clear, however, that the issue even arises in the Bosnian case.
There is no reason to think the Muslim sector would not be economically viable: though small, it
would be considerably larger and have a greater population than many independent states. Bosnia is not
a necessary or even logical economic unit, so it is not clear that the Muslim sector would lose any
essential economic hinterland-areas which, in any event, have been largely separate economically
since 1992. The Muslim sector would be land-locked, but that is not an essential element of economic
prosperity. It would be non-contiguous, but that simply means it would require good relations with Croat
areas-which, having secured independence, would have no reason for conflict with the Muslim sector.
Of course, its economy would be prostrate and pathetic, but it already is.
It is hard to see why the Muslim sector would not be politically viable. It was already recognized
as the government of Bosnia during the war, when it controlled less territory and had an even more
tenuous authority than it does today. The Muslim sector would certainly be militarily viable: its armed
forces are the strongest in Bosnia, and in the event of renewed conflict, would probably defeat the now-
decrepit Republika Srpska forces. Interview with anonymous OHR officials in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz.
(Mar. 15, 2004), supra note 9.
In any event, outsiders often overestimate the necessary size of a state. In 1991, the European
Community mediator, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, "[went] on record as saying Slovenia is too
small to be viable." Bernard D. Kaplan, Can Freedom Come in Packages Too Small To Suit US.?,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 10, 1991, at All. Slovenia joined the European Union in May
2004.
The Muslim sector's viability is probably not the issue. Rather, even if viable, such a state might
be a source of resentment, given the large numbers of aggrieved refugees who would view a separate
Serb or Croat state as an injustice; this might give rise to instability that would directly affect the broader
region. Yet even if we concede this possibility, it is not clear that a territorially defined, legally
cognizable people's right to create a state ought to be restricted because of security concerns, however
legitimate and justifiable, that emanate from a neighboring state and community. It is not clear, in other
words, why the appropriate response for the international community would be to restrain that
resentment, rather than refuse the secession that generates it. The example is Yugoslavia itself: the
evident dissatisfaction of many nationalist Serbs and the Belgrade authorities at the prospect of Bosnia's
independence did not give them a recognized right to resist that secession.
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niceties; they rather require us to draw the conclusions that necessity, justice,
and preference dictate, or allow.
The key intuitive leap is to admit that the state of Bosnia, like any state,
is a means toward the security, welfare, and hopes of the peoples who happen
to live in it - or rather, who live in what happens to be it. Bosnia is not an end
unto itself, nor a mirror for our vanities, nor an abstract moral claim. Our
policies towards that state are therefore instrumental and preferential, not
bound by some supposed absolute obligation, whether moral or legal.
Outsiders united in a common desire for those peoples' prosperity, and a
common interest in peace and stability, should contemplate whatever
condition or state(s) will best attain those aims. Making Bosnia a moral
imperative limits our vision and their options.
Our only response to this intuition thus far has been: "you cannot ask
these questions." This is a circular policy that, like colonialism, is probably
sustainable as long as our will holds. It might even work, given enough time
and enough pressure. But, it is not a policy that is necessary for increased
stability and prosperity, nor one that respects the prerogatives of democracy.
If we reflect upon it seriously, it is not a policy that brings Bosnians or us
closer to justice, since justice has been deracinated, reduced to nothing but
defense of these borders for their own sake-not for the people they enclose-
as a totem of the justice we failed to ensure a decade ago.
I began by noting the aura of moral imperative hovering around
"Bosnia." If we begin to ask these questions, what becomes of claims for
justice, which surely implicate us all? This is the moral objection again, and
the rebuttal is that democratic autonomy has its own moral value. However
salutary our intention not to vindicate today those who profited by evil
yesterday, there is hubris in asserting that humanity's interests are necessarily
and always greater than those of that portion of humanity most directly and
deleteriously affected by our interpretations of the higher good. We have
every right to insist that individuals charged with crimes against humanity
face justice in The Hague and be excluded from the political process. 170 We
have every right to insist that no state and no people in that region threaten our
common security again. But, insisting on a particular territorial dispensation
as the only expression of historical justice, regardless of historically created
contemporary conditions, is to insist on justice though the heavens may fall.
But then, the heavens will not fall on us.
Bosnia's peoples live with the effects of a political system distorted by
our rigid, shibboleth-ridden, imposed conception of what their future can be.
Our reflexive commitment is now, ten years on, anachronistic and tragically
late for those still living. Refusing to allow millions of people to find political
and economic certainty even though another policy might better achieve those
170. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by the
U.N. Security Council in 1993. Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for the Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Secretary-General, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). The Tribunal sought to
address the atrocities taking place in the Balkans War.
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goals, solely to vindicate a moral principle ten years after its vindication was
sorely needed, ten years after it was affirmatively possible, is not necessarily
the moral thing to do. If that principle is, moreover, more deeply felt and
insisted upon in foreign capitals, universities, and think-tanks than in the
former killing fields themselves, it may not only offend a properly considered
moral sensibility, but trespass upon other political and moral values, such as
the autonomy of individuals and their societies, living in the wake of their
own history, to make and unmake of themselves what they will.
Even if real existing Bosnia really were the only way to give meaning to
the claims of justice, the retrospective demands of justice, however important,
cannot alone dictate the future, nor a whole people's hopes for justice,
stability, and prosperity in that future. Bosnia's recent tragic past does not
insulate it from the risk of failure or the logic of dissolution as a legal
category. If Bosnia were to fail, or if we were to admit that it has, what would
or should succeed it? It cannot.be that the war and its cruelties have foreclosed
an obvious and compelling alternative: national states. On the contrary,
however uncomfortable it may make the moralist to admit it, the war and its
cruelties may have made that alternative the only one, if people there no
longer believe in any other. Our greatest gift on Dayton's next anniversary
might be allowing Bosnia's peoples peaceably to continue or to end their own
state, not perpetuating it like the ghost of a departed dream playing out in
someone else's waking.
It is at least worth asking Bosnians what they want now. It is worth
letting "them" become a part of "us." On the battlefields of law and politics
after the Yugoslav wars, little seems to have changed, but much more is
possible. Bosnia's Croats, Muslims, and Serbs do not have a right to self-
determination because formal doctrine is too clearly aligned against such a
possibility, but Bosnia's peoples may increasingly have a claim about
democracy and an expectation of recognition. These possibilities may not be
grounded on the right to secede, but instead on the claim that Bosnia has
failed to come fully into being--or at least on a recognition that Bosnia's
constituent populations ought not be asked to integrate further without first
being free to express their will. This is within the realm of political
possibility-and may actually be more just-whatever the doctrines say.
D. Mere Doctrine: Limits to the Precedent and Underlying Ferment
The Yugoslav crisis showed that non-territorial ethno-national groups
had no doctrinal claim in 1990 and have no claim today qua nations. Yet the
war and the peace have also shown how an underlying ethnic claim can be
brought into concordance with a doctrinally cognizable claim (i.e., by
recognizing territorially delimited federal successions to a failed state), such
that the population of a territory, not a nation itself, might secede. This, so far,
might be one more in a dangerous line of destabilizing precedents, 171 or
171. See, e.g., Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997,
at 22 (placing a possible Bosnian partition in the context of the Indo-Pakistani, Cypriot, Irish, and
Palestinian partitions). But see Chaim D. Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers
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nothing more than a variant of the claims advanced in the 1990s, by scholars,
about a right for federal units to secede. 172 Yet the implications of this
argument are at once limited and dynamic.
The claim is limited by its post hoc, status quo basis. Nothing in it would
require the international community to acquiesce in violent change, ethnic
cleansing, the violation of human rights, or even in any particular attempt at
secession. Nothing in it requires us to support a challenge to any status quo.
All the claim does assert is that, having failed to intervene, the international
community may, and perhaps eventually should, recognize the formation of a
new state, especially if events have created that new state in a shape that
international law already recognizes (i.e., defined territories succeeding to
failed states). This might make Bosnia a precedent for Kosovo, 173 but not for
Macedonia, or much of Africa, where, rightly or not, the status quo still holds
and separatism has so far been avoided.
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Though limited, the claim is also dynamic: acknowledging the
generative potential of recognition in the context of dissolved, failed, or
inchoate states frees policymakers from the limits of doctrinal rigidity,
whether in Bosnia, elsewhere in the Balkans, or in places like Afghanistan,
Iraq, Indonesia, the Congo, or Sudan. If there is no external or objective
grounding to a policy other than our will and a sense of moral rightness, then
at least we should see that clearly, and persist only if we are certain the policy
is right and liable to succeed. If success is stability and peace, then it may be
the case that a different dispensation or a different recognition would serve
better. In place of the rigid rule of territorial integrity absolute, this is a
doctrine of possibility.
More than mere flexibility, there is a normative drive to the claim. It is
in effect a doctrinal proxy that converges with an underlying claim about the
shape of the polity, the self that determines in a democratic society. Over time,
proxies should and do give way to their authentic expressions. There is
probably an inevitable and unavoidable question arising from this claim: do
the internal structures in a country comport with or hinder the expression of
political sentiment by groups of individuals who identify with each other?
Only defined territories may receive recognition, but could a state
permanently refuse to create territorial definitions that its own people wanted,
solely to forestall the risk of partition? What would the justification for this
be?
and Partitions in the Twentieth Century, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1998, at 120, 120-56 (rebutting Kumar).
172. See, e.g., Otto Kimminich, A "Federal" Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW
OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 23, at 83; Patrick Thomberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect
of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra note 23, at 101; Hannum, supra note 58, at 64-65, 69.
173. See Morton Abramowitz, Going Backward in the Balkans, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2004, at
A23 (noting linkages between Kosovo and Bosnia, and stating that "[t]he failure to establish Kosovo
statehood creates massive uncertainty in the Balkans, exacerbates tensions between Albanians and
Serbs, delays investment and growth, and keeps Serbia focused on the past").
174. But see Patrick Moore, What To Do About Bosnia?, supra note 5 ("The problem--or
virtue--of partition is that it would most likely involve not just Bosnia-Herzegovina but every state in
the region .... [and] would vindicate the results of previous ethnic cleansing campaigns, set off new
ones, and preclude any attempt at multiethnic statehood ... ").
Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives
The most obvious objection is that a flexible doctrine poses risks to
states' stability. This may prove a sufficient objection, but that is a question
for further research: what are the costs of our commitment to territorial
integrity in places like the Balkans and Africa? It may be that the commitment
to territorial integrity actually increases suffering by strengthening the hand of
elites in ruling peoples whom they have no business ruling. If states truly are
so fragile that allowing their own peoples peaceably to consider their
reformation would destroy them (and while many are, not all states are so
fragile), why do we believe it is not only necessary, but preferable to defend
them? Why not see that fragility as a proof of the need for reform? The
answer is, I suggest, unclear, and certainly less clear than our confident,
unquestioned doctrinal commitment would suggest. The limited case of
Bosnia-unique in being a secession nearly perfected save for recognition-
only suggests the outlines of this future debate. It does not resolve the
question for societies that have not yet been through wars of their own.
So, this argument seems like a claim for a doctrine in transition, in that it
is a conceptually coherent doctrinal position, but an interim one that will
ultimately raise underlying questions about the legitimacy of insisting on
fixed, territorially defined resolutions that pre-define supposedly self-
determining polities. This will have extraordinary, explosive, liberating,
dangerous, moral implications for states and for their peoples, though not just
yet. The limit of Bosnia is that, for now, only identifiable territories need be
subjects for our recognition in international law. The challenge of Bosnia is
that when such territories are obviously proxies for something else, that
something else--or someone else-will demand recognition, a demand to
which mere doctrine should, must, and ultimately will respond.
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